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ABSTRACT 
Since 2001, violent sub-national groups with disparate ideologies and motivations 
have been working together to further their objectives. They are collaborating, sharing 
each other’s tactics, and learning from one another’s successes and failures. What is the 
background or historical context of the crime-terror nexus, and what challenges does it 
present to U.S. homeland security practitioners? This thesis uses a case study approach to 
examine the history of the nexus between transnational criminal organizations and 
foreign terrorist organizations. The three case studies are then used as the data for the 
analysis chapter, which shows the historical and emerging relationships between states 
and the three violent sub-national groups. The three case studies suggest the activities of 
these violent sub-national groups are protean in nature; they are best described by 
analysts as falling into the “gray area phenomenon.” The three case studies, the analysis, 
and conclusion of this thesis support the recommendation that more effort needs to be 
placed on intelligence collection, especially at the domestic and local levels. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Since 2001, violent sub-national groups with disparate ideologies and motivations 
have been working together to further their objectives. They are collaborating, sharing 
each other’s tactics, and learning from one another’s successes and failures. To 
comprehend fully the complex nature of the nexus or convergence of transnational 
criminal organizations (TCOs) and foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), the research 
first examines the root causes and contributing factors that have given rise to the nexus. 
Mexican transnational criminal organizations (MTCOs) are flourishing both south 
and north of the United States (U.S.) border with Mexico.1 They operate with 
sophisticated business plans that parallel legitimate multi-national corporations.2 The 
MTCOs are taking full advantage of globalization, advantages in technology, 
communication, and logistics.3 As the MTCOs have grown in wealth, and operational 
capability, they have also increased their willingness to commit acts of extreme violence 
in an effort to terrorize, threaten, intimidate, and coerce people in a manner that had 
previously only been perpetrated by terrorist organizations.4 
At the same time, many of the traditional terrorism funding methods, such as 
charitable donations, which were used to fund the 9/11 attacks, came under intense 
scrutiny from the U.S. government and its allies.5 Today, it is imperative that FTOs fund 
their operations in a manner that keeps it below the radar of law enforcement. As a result, 
many terror groups are now turning to activities that were once considered the sole 
domain of criminal organizations, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, human 
1 Jennifer L. Hesterman, The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels, 
Organized Crime, and Terror Groups (Boca, FL: Taylor & Francis, 2013), 329. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 United States, Executive Office of the President, United States and President, Strategy to Combat 
Transnational Organized Crime Addressing Converging Threats to National Security (Washington, DC: 
Executive Office of the President, 2011). 
5 Hesterman, The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels, Organized 
Crime, and Terror Group, 4. 
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trafficking, etc.6 According to the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, 
the U.S. Department of Justice reports “29 of the 63 organizations on its FY2010 
Consolidated Priority Organization Targets list, which includes the most significant 
international drug trafficking organizations threatening the United States, were associated 
with terrorist groups.”7 
At times, the crime-terror nexus has been promoted and facilitated by different 
nation states.8 For example, the late Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez, promoted what 
he called, “‘asymmetric war,’ ‘fourth generation war,’ ‘people’s war,’ or ‘super 
insurgency.’” 9 Chavez also widely distributed copies of Jorge Verstrynge’s book 
entitled, Peripheral War and the Islamic Revolution, which according to Max 
Manwaring, has become “one of the most comprehensive and universally read analyses 
of contemporary revolutionary conflict.”10 A Spanish Leninist scholar, Verstrynge calls 
modern conflicts guerra periferica or peripheral war.11 “Guerra periferica,” as 
Verstrynge describes it, combines irregular or asymmetrical, unrestricted and total war 
involving several different methods, with protracted war that recognizes time as a factor 
in contemporary conflict.12 
Today, transnational crime is on the rise. MTCOs operate undeterred on all seven 
continents. Similarly, the U.S. State Department’s list of FTOs continues to grow, with 
six new organizations added in 2014.13 If left unchecked, the nexus between these 
                                                 
6 United States, Executive Office of the President, United States and President, Strategy to Combat 
Transnational Organized Crime Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. 
7 The White House, Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (Washington, DC: The White 
House, 2011). 
8 Jon B. Perdue, The War of all the People: The Nexus of Latin American Radicalism and Middle 
Eastern Terrorism (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012). 
9 Max G. Manwaring, The Complexity of Modern Asymmetric Warfare (Norman, OK: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2012), 5. 
10 Ibid., 4. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” accessed October 3, 2015, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/ 
des/123085.htm. 
xiii 
disparate groups will only make their suppression or eradication increasingly more 
difficult. 
This thesis uses a case study approach to examine the history of the nexus 
between TCOs and FTOs. The three violent sub-national groups selected for the case 
studies are each engaged in a variety of illicit activities that could be classified as both 
criminal and terroristic in nature. For these reasons, the three violent sub-national groups 
pose a significant threat to U.S. homeland security, through their interactions and 
cooperation with one another. For the purposes of this thesis, the case studies focus on 
the three violent sub-national groups known as Hezbollah, the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the MTCOs. Each of these violent sub–national groups 
also has a distinct primary area of operation represented in specific geographic areas, 
which means their various illicit activities have broad implications for U.S. homeland 
security.  
The three case studies suggest the activities of these violent sub-national groups 
are so protean in nature; they are best described by analysts as falling into the “gray area 
phenomenon.”14 The three case studies, the analysis, and conclusion of this thesis support 
the following recommendations:  
• More effort needs to be placed on intelligence collection, especially at the
domestic and local levels
• Strategic level decision makers across the U.S. homeland security
enterprise should review both versions of the National Criminal
Intelligence Sharing Plan, and work collaboratively to implement the
recommendations contained in both versions.
• Strategic level decision makers across the U.S. homeland security
enterprise should consider working to increase the collaboration and
reduce the division between the fields of counterdrug and counterterrorism
intelligence to disrupt the crime-terror nexus more effectively.
14 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2006), 432. 
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Since 2001, violent sub-national groups with disparate ideologies and motivations 
have been working together to further their objectives. They are collaborating, sharing 
each other’s tactics, and learning from one another’s successes and failures. To 
comprehend fully the complex nature of the nexus or convergence of transnational 
criminal organizations (TCOs) and foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) the research 
first examines the root causes and contributing factors, which have given rise to the 
nexus. 
Mexican transnational criminal organizations (MTCOs) are flourishing both south 
and north of the United States (U.S.) border with Mexico.1 They operate with 
sophisticated business plans that parallel legitimate multi-national corporations.2 The 
MTCOs are taking full advantage of globalization, advantages in technology, 
communication, and logistics.3 As the MTCOs have grown in wealth, and operational 
capability, they have also increased their willingness to commit acts of extreme violence 
in an effort to terrorize, threaten, intimidate, and coerce people in a manner that had 
previously only been perpetrated by terrorist organizations.4 
At the same time, many of the traditional terrorism funding methods, such as 
charitable donations, which were used to fund the 9/11 attacks, came under intense 
scrutiny from the U.S. government and its allies.5 Today, it is imperative that FTOs fund 
their operations in a manner that keeps it below the radar of law enforcement. As a result, 
many terror groups are now turning to activities that were once considered the sole 
domain of criminal organizations, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, human 
                                                 
1 Jennifer L. Hesterman, The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels, 
Organized Crime, and Terror Groups (Boca, FL: Taylor & Francis, 2013), 329. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 United States, Executive Office of the President, United States and President, Strategy to Combat 
Transnational Organized Crime Addressing Converging Threats to National Security (Washington, DC: 
Executive Office of the President, 2011). 
5 Hesterman, The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels, Organized 
Crime, and Terror Groups, 4. 
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trafficking, etc.6 According to the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, 
the U.S. Department of Justice reports “29 of the 63 organizations on its FY2010 
Consolidated Priority Organization Targets list, which includes the most significant 
international drug trafficking organizations threatening the United States, were associated 
with terrorist groups.”7 
At times, the crime-terror nexus has been promoted and facilitated by different 
nation states.8 For example, the late Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez, promoted what 
he called, “‘asymmetric war,’ ‘fourth generation war,’ ‘people’s war,’ or ‘super 
insurgency.’”9 Chavez also widely distributed copies of Jorge Verstrynge’s book entitled, 
Peripheral War and the Islamic Revolution, which according to Max Manwaring, has 
become “one of the most comprehensive and universally read analyses of contemporary 
revolutionary conflict.”10 A Spanish Leninist scholar, Verstrynge calls modern conflicts 
guerra periferica or peripheral war.11 “Guerra periferica,” as Verstrynge describes it, 
combines irregular or asymmetrical, unrestricted and total war involving several different 
methods, with protracted war that recognizes time as a factor in contemporary conflict.12 
Today, transnational crime is on the rise. MTCOs operate undeterred on all seven 
continents. Similarly, the U.S. State Department’s list of FTOs continues to grow, with 
six new organizations added in 2014.13 If left unchecked, the nexus between these 
disparate groups will only make their suppression or eradication increasingly more 
difficult. 
                                                 
6 United States, Executive Office of the President, United States and President, Strategy to Combat 
Transnational Organized Crime Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. 
7 The White House, Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (Washington, DC: The White 
House, 2011). 
8 Jon B. Perdue, The War of all the People: The Nexus of Latin American Radicalism and Middle 
Eastern Terrorism (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012). 
9 Max G. Manwaring, The Complexity of Modern Asymmetric Warfare (Norman, OK: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2012), 5. 
10 Ibid., 4. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” accessed October 3, 2015, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/ 
other/des/123085.htm. 
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A. WHY IS THE CRIME-TERROR NEXUS A PROBLEM WORTHY OF 
RESEARCH? 
According to a March 2010 Congressional Research Service report entitled, 
“International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and 
Considerations for Congress” the authors argue, “more research on the subject from 
academic and non-profit communities could also improve the availability of knowledge 
on the subject.”14 They go on to point out that “without such resources, the intelligence 
community and the wider policy community cannot accurately gauge the scope and 
nature of relationships between terrorists and criminal actors, as well as to assess 
convergence trends and predict future connections.” The authors conclude by pointing 
out, “the lack of assessment on how, why, and in what ways criminals and terrorists liaise 
with each other can prevent policy makers from devising appropriate strategies to combat 
the nexus.”15 
This thesis addresses three primary research questions: 
• What is the background or historical context of the crime-terror nexus?
• How extensive is the problem of the crime-terror nexus?
• What challenges does the crime-terror nexus present for homeland
security practitioners?
Material regarding the nexus or convergence of TCOs and FTOs is typically 
buried in obscure, sometimes classified government documents, press releases, court 
records, and news articles only available from foreign media sources, which are rarely 
reported on by the media in the United States. Through the synthesis of a variety of 
different sources of information, this thesis pulls together a comprehensive understanding 
of the crime-terror nexus, while answering the basic questions of who, what, where, why 
and how for the readers, and provide policy level analysis and propose recommendations. 
This research is relevant to policy makers and strategic planners charged with 
14 John Rollins, Liana S. Wyler, and Seth Rosen, International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: 
Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress (CRS Report No. R41004) (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010). 
15 Ibid. 
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responsibilities relating to U.S. homeland security, emerging threats, TCOs, FTOs, and 
other emerging hybrid forms of violence. 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis uses a case study approach to examine the history of the nexus 
between TCOs and FTOs. The three case studies are then used as the data for the analysis 
chapter, which shows the historical, emerging, and relationships between states and the 
three violent sub-national groups.  
The three violent sub-national groups selected for the case studies are each 
engaged in a variety of illicit activities that could be classified as both criminal and 
terroristic in nature. For these reasons, the three violent sub-national groups pose a 
significant threat to U.S. homeland security, through their interactions and cooperation 
with one another. For the purposes of this thesis, the case studies focus on the three 
violent sub-national groups known as Hezbollah, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC), and the MTCOs. Each of these violent sub–national groups also has a 
distinct primary area of operation represented in specific geographic areas, which means 
their various illicit activities have broad implications for U.S. homeland security.  
According to the U.S. Department of Justice reports “29 of the 63 organizations 
on its FY2010 Consolidated Priority Organization Targets list, which includes the most 
significant international drug trafficking organizations threatening the United States, were 
associated with terrorist groups.”16 The case studies do not extend beyond the three 
violent sub-national group previously discussed in an effort to limit the size and scope of 
the project, and because it would be impossible to discuss the criminal activities of all 29 
FTOs with ties to TCOs within this thesis. The analysis is also limited to the activities of 
the three violent sub-national groups that would indicate they are engaging in criminal 
(i.e., drug trafficking) or terroristic activity. In other words, these three case studies are 
very selective, and focused on the crime-terrorism nexus and provide data for further 
analysis in a later chapter of this thesis. 
                                                 
16 United States, Executive Office of the President, United States and President, Strategy to Combat 
Transnational Organized Crime Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. 
5 
The research for this thesis draws upon information contained in a variety of 
different sources regarding the TCOs and FTOs. Reports from the U.S. Department of 
Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the U.S. Department of State, the 
Congressional Research Service, as well as congressional testimony are used to 
determine the homeland security challenges associated with the nexus between TCOs and 
FTOs. For example, the State Department’s 2012 country reports on terrorism will be one 
of the sources used for this thesis. Besides the sources that have already been identified, 
information contained in a research papers and reports produced by non-government 
organizations, including the Kiernan Group Holdings, The Rand Corporation, the West 
Point Counter Terrorism Center, are also analyzed and considered with respect to the 
extent of the nexus.  
This research improves the analysis of the crime-terror nexus giving policymakers 
at all levels of government insight into creating appropriate strategies related to this 
homeland security challenge. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following critical analysis of the extant literature is organized around, and 
related directly to the research questions posed in this thesis. The analysis is presented in 
three parts relative to the organization of this research. The first part covers the 
background and support of the nexus between criminality and terror in relation to 
different countries, which are facilitating ongoing, small, irregular, asymmetric, and 
revolutionary wars, in which violent sub-national actors are helping their political 
patrons. Secondly, the extent of the threat posed by the convergence or nexus TCOs and 
FTOs is considered through the careful examination of three groups of violent sub-
national groups: Hezbollah, the FARC, and the Mexican TCOs. The third part examines 
the challenges the nexus presents for homeland security practitioners. The research is 
divided into two essential and explanatory categories, (1) background and support of the 
nexus, and (2) how extensive is the crime-terror nexus?  
A. PART I—THE BACKGROUND OF THE CRIME-TERROR NEXUS 
The literature on the background and historical context of the crime-terror nexus 
begins with the writings of Karl Marx, Frederick Engles, and Vladimir Lenin. As early as 
1848, with the release of the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engles wrote about the 
three classes of society: the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, and the lumpenproletariat.17 First 
Marx and Engles in the mid-1800s, then Lenin in the early 1900s, would all write about 
the use of the lumpenproletariat as a means of creating chaos, havoc, and disorder during 
revolutionary times.18 Lenin’s writings in particular cover the use of violent crime as a 
means of funding the revolutionary forces.19 The literature by all three individuals when 
taken as a whole describes how the founders of Marxism-Leninism believed that acts of 
both terrorism and violent crime are permissible subversive methods for achieving 
                                                 
17 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (New York: International 
Publishers, 1948). 
18 Ibid. 
19 Vladimir Il’ich Lenin, Selected Works in Three Volumes. Uniform Title: Works. Selections. English. 
1970 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970–1971). 
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revolutionary goals.20 Understanding these early Marxist-Leninist writings is particularly 
important to understanding fully the crime-terror nexus in contemporary times. 
B. LITERATURE FROM COLD WAR UNTIL THE COLLAPSE OF THE 
BERLIN WALL 
During the Cold War era following World War II, most of what was written about 
the crime-terror nexus focused on the activities of communist east bloc nations in 
encouraging and training violent sub-national groups to commit acts of terrorism in an 
effort to subvert legitimate governments in the West. During the late 1970s and 1980s, 
several books were written on the topic of communist support of terrorism. For example, 
the book International Terrorism—The Communist Connection was released in 1978.21 It 
was followed in the 1980s by books like The Terror Network by Claire Sterling,22 and 
Terrorism: The Soviet Connection by Ray Cline and Yonah Alexander.23 However, not 
all books written on the topic of communist support for terrorism as a method of 
subversion were written by Americans. For example, The World Held Hostage was 
written by Desmond McForan from the United Kingdom.24 Also, it is important to 
understand considerable disagreement occurs about whether communist nations were 
fomenting terrorism violence as a means of subversion. British author Stephen Segaller’s 
book, Invisible Armies, written in 1987, serves as an example of an alternative opinion of 
the time.25 Also, it is worth noting the literature of the period did not focus solely on the 
Soviet Union. In addition, several books were written about Cuba’s involvement in 
training, supplying, and encouraging violent sub-national groups, particularly in Latin 
                                                 
20 Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection (New York: Crane Russak, 
1984). 
21 Stefan Thomas Possony and L. Francis Bouchey, International Terrorism—The Communist 
Connection: With a Case Study of West German Terrorist Ulrike Meinhof (Washington, DC: American 
Council for World Freedom, 1978). 
22 Claire Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart, and Winston, 1981). 
23 Cline and Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection. 
24 Desmond McForan, The World Held Hostage: The War Waged by International Terrorism (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987). 
25 Stephen Segaller, Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990s (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1987). 
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America. For example, in 1987, Rex Hudson published his book, Castro’s America 
Department: Systemizing Insurgencies in Latin America, which details Cuba’s subversive 
activities throughout the Caribbean basin during the 1980s.26  
There are three important things to understand about the literature surrounding the 
crime-terror nexus written between the late 1970s and the late 1980s before the collapse 
of the Berlin Wall, and eventually, the collapse of the Soviet Union. First, considerable 
disagreement occurs about whether the communist nations were encouraging terrorism as 
a means of subversion. A considerable amount of literature was written during this 
period, which added a level of detail regarding the methods used by some nations to 
subvert existing governments. Third, the literature of the period focused primarily on 
communist support and encouragement for terrorism, rather than organized crime, 
although some of the authors clearly recognized an overlap existed between the two as a 
means of subversion. 
C. LITERATURE AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE BERLIN WALL 
UNTIL SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
During the years between the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001, a significant change in the broader understanding of the crime-
terror nexus occurred, which was reflected in the literature of the period. Following the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall, and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, new 
information became available that confirmed the communist engagement in subversive 
activities including both crime and terrorism. It changed the understanding of the topic of 
the crime-terror nexus. For example, in 1999, John Koehler’s book, Stasi: The Untold 
Story of the East German Secret Police, provided details of the Stasi’s subversive 
activities on a global scale.27 Another example is Christopher Andrew’s book, The Sword 
and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB, which 
                                                 
26 Rex A. Hudson, “Castro’s America Department: Systemizing Insurgencies in Latin America,” 
Terrorism 9, no. 2 (1987): 125–167. 
27 John O. Koehler, Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1999). 
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provided considerable insights into the Soviet Union’s efforts to encourage, train, and 
supply terrorists through a global network of communist nations.28  
Two important considerations have been raised regarding the literature on the 
crime-terror nexus from the period between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the attacks of 
9/11. First, the literature of this period resolved the discourse about whether communist 
nations were or were not encouraging international terrorism as a means of subversion. 
Second, the literature of this period also shed light on the fact the Soviet Union was 
exporting their model for creating subversion. In an effort to maintain a level of 
deniability, the Soviet Union utilized proxies to provide encouragement, training, and 
supplies to violent sub-national groups all over the world.29 This last point is particularly 
relevant to the understanding of the crime-terror nexus in contemporary times because it 
explains that multiple countries around the world were taught how to engage in 
subversive activities against their adversaries.  
D. POST-SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, LITERATURE 
Some of the literature takes a different approach, taking an in-depth look at post-
World War II, Cold War politics and the Soviet Union’s efforts to facilitate the 
relationship between Middle Eastern terrorism groups and Latin American revolutionary 
groups. This literature describes how the Soviets would utilize proxies, like Cuba’s Fidel 
Castro, and the “Organization of Solidarity with the People of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America” in an effort to avoid being implicated in their subversive activities. By looking 
at the historical context and how the Soviet Union helped to facilitate a working 
relationship between Middle East extremists and Latin American revolutionaries, the 
literature provides an understanding of state sponsorship of terrorism, which still applies 
to this nation’s contemporary understanding of the crime-terror nexus. An example of 
this type of literature would be Jon Perdue’s book, War of All the People.30 The book is 
                                                 
28 Christopher M. Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive 
and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999). 
29 Ibid., 181. 
30 Perdue, The War of all the People: The Nexus of Latin American Radicalism and Middle Eastern 
Terrorism. 
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important to the understanding of the crime-terror nexus because it shows how the 
previously confirmed subversive methods of communist nations are being replicated in 
the modern contemporary era, and now pose a serious threat to the United States and its 
allies.  
Much of what has been written about the crime-terror nexus since the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, has focused on specific violent sub-national groups, such 
as Hezbollah, or on specific geographic regions, such as Latin America. For example, 
Matt Levitt’s book, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God, 
addresses Hezbollah’s engagement in both terroristic tactics and criminal activities, but it 
focuses solely on this one sub-national group.31 An example of a book with a regional 
focus is Luis Fleischmen’s Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to 
the United States, which focuses on the Bolivarian revolution’s attempts to foment chaos, 
havoc, and disorder through their support of violent sub-national groups on both sides of 
the crime-terror nexus.32 While books of this nature do touch on the issue of the crime-
terror nexus, adding to the contemporary understanding of it, the nexus is not the primary 
topic the authors are attempting to address. 
A book by Jennifer Hesterman, a retired Air Force Intelligence Analyst, entitled, 
The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus, serves as an exception. Hesterman approaches the subject 
from a strategically and generalizable perspective. Hesterman’s work effectively ties 
FTOs to the Mexican TCOs or cartels operating along our southwest border. By exposing 
this relationship, Hesterman demonstrates how the nexus is now a direct threat to U.S. 
homeland security. Her discussion of how the Mexican TCOs are smuggling special 
interest aliens, those with ties to terrorism, across the U.S. border with Mexico is 
particularly compelling.33 
                                                 
31 Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (London: C. Hurst 
and Company, 2013). 
32 Luis Fleischman, Latin America in the Post-Chávez Era: The Security Threat to the United States 
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013), 277. 
33 Hesterman, The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels, Organized 
Crime, and Terror Groups, 154. 
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Throughout all the literature, very little argument has been raised that FTOs have 
turned to the criminal activity as a means to raise funds to support their operations. For 
example, according to the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, the U.S. 
Department of Justice reports “29 of the 63 organizations on its FY 2010 Consolidated 
Priority Organization Targets list, which includes the most significant international drug 
trafficking organizations (DTOs) threatening the United States, were associated with 
terrorist groups.”34 Many of these government documents, such as the U.S. Department 
of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, cover a variety of topics about what has 
been done to address the problem of the nexus in different parts of the world, and 
involving different FTOs.  
However, most government reports are very focused on specific topics. For 
example, the Congressional Research Service wrote a report entitled, Columbia: 
Background, U.S. Relations, and Congressional Interest.35 Documents of this nature are 
not attempting to tackle the entire discussion of the crime-terror nexus in one all-
encompassing document. As a result, most of the government reports that touch on the 
FTOs and their activities are policy documents, and fail to communicate the full extent of 
the problem to the reader. Still, these reports provide valuable insights on specific aspects 
of the crime-terror nexus. This thesis references a number of government reports 
pertaining to a variety of different aspects of the crime-terrorism nexus in an effort to 
give the reader an understanding of the full extent of the problem through the case studies 
of the three different violent sub-national groups covered. 
                                                 
34 United States, Executive Office of the President, United States and President, Strategy to Combat 
Transnational Organized Crime Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. 
35 June S. Beittel, Colombia Background, U.S. Relations, and Congressional Interest (CRS Report No. 
RL32250) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012).  
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E. PART II—A THREE PART CASE STUDY OF HEZBOLLAH, THE FARC, 
AND THE MEXICAN CARTELS 
1. The Middle East and Hezbollah
The literature on Hezbollah is vast describing its foundation, terror activities, and 
evolution to its status today as a legitimate political and military organization.36 
One of the weaknesses of the literature on Hezbollah is that most of the books 
lack primary sources. However, a few books serve as good primary sources of 
information, such as Hizbullah’s Documents from the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 
Manifesto, by Joseph Alagha. The book is a compilation of all of Hezbollah’s available 
documents translated into English. Another book that serves as a primary source of 
information about Hezbollah is, Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan 
Nasrallah by Nicholas Noe, a collection of Nasrallah’s public statements. Although both 
books are a good source of information that is extremely relevant to understanding 
Hezbollah’s stated goals and objectives, they are not without their limitations. For 
example, both books are somewhat dated. Noe’s book was copyrighted in 2007, and 
Alagha’s book in 2011. Thus, one of the weaknesses, or gaps, in the existing open source 
literature is the lack of primary sources of information related to how Hezbollah’s goals 
and objectives may have changed in the last four to eight years, especially with regard to 
the changing situation in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, or even Latin America. 
Another weakness of the overall literature on Hezbollah is in the area of the 
organization’s modern engagement in criminal activity. One book is by Tom Diaz and 
Barbara Newman entitled, Lightning Out of Lebanon.37 However, the book is written in a 
narrative style, and the author relies too heavily on private conversations with law 
enforcement officials, which are impossible to verify through supporting documentation. 
36 Augustus R. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); 
Michael J. Totten, The Road to Fatima Gate: The Beirut Spring, the Rise of Hezbollah, and the Iranian 
War against Israel (New York: Encounter Books, 2011); Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of 
Lebanon’s Party of God. 
37 Tom Diaz and Barbara Newman, Lightning Out of Lebanon: Hezbollah Terrorists on American Soil 
(New York: Ballantine Books, 2005). 
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Unfortunately, it remains one of the only attempts to address the issue of Hezbollah’s 
engagement in criminal activity in the Western Hemisphere. 
2. South America and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia  
As a body of literature, when compared to all the literature that has been written 
about Hezbollah, comparatively little has been written about the FARC.  
Very few books address the subject of the background and history of the FARC. 
The exception is, The FARC: The Longest Insurgency, by Gary Leech.38 Leech’s work 
spends the first three chapters providing a detailed history of the development of the 
FARC from the 1960s through the modern era. Then, Leech dedicates a large portion to 
the FARC’s engagement in drug trafficking, explaining in some detail why the FARC 
became involved with coca production, and also how the organization benefits from the 
sale of cocaine. The book is relevant to the understanding of the crime-terror nexus 
because it provides valuable insights about how the FARC, as a terrorist organization, has 
benefited financially from its involvement in drug trafficking and criminal activity in 
general.  
Another book that addresses the history and background of the FARC is James J. 
Brittain’s book entitled, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: The Origin and 
Direction of the FARC-EP. Brittain, although a sociologist, uses his book as a systemic 
defense of the FARC declaring they are “not only preparing to act as a legitimate 
government in a socialist Colombia, but readying the population for a post-capitalist 
society not monetarily dependent on the coca industry.” Brittain’s book is relevant to the 
subject because it provides an important contrary opinion to the thesis proposition that 
the crime-terrorism nexus presents a unique threat to homeland security. For example, 
Brittain argues that any suggestion the FARC’s sustainability has been linked to drug 
trafficking and criminal activity are “historically limited (politically neglectful) and fail 
to analyze the praxis of the insurgency.”39 
                                                 
38 Garry M. Leech, The FARC: The Longest Insurgency (London: Zed Books, 2011). 
39 James J. Brittain, Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: The Origin and Direction of the 
FARC-EP (New York: Pluto Press, 2010), 44. 
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When looking at the body of literature surrounding the FARC, relatively little 
literature has been written that addresses the FARC’s interactions with TCOs. Most of 
what has been written comes in the form of scholarly articles, trade journal articles, or 
government documents. For example, in February 2014, Jane’s published a report 
entitled, “Colombia: Security Assessment,” which stated, “There are indications of 
growing ties between Mexican-based transnational crime organisation (TCOs) and 
criminal groups in Colombia resulting from the increasingly horizontal structure of the 
cocaine supply chain.”40 Such reports provide tidbits of information that shed light on the 
FARC’s interactions with TCOs and their engagement in criminal activity, as well as the 
dynamic, amorphous, and constantly evolving nature of the crime-terror nexus. 
In terms of primary sources of information about the relationship between 
Venezuela and the FARC, one of the best open sources available is “The FARC Files: 
Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of Raul Reyes.” Reyes was a FARC 
commander killed on March 1, 2008, when the Colombian military conducted a raid on a 
FARC camp located 1.1 miles in Ecuadorean territory.41 The Colombian military seized a 
number of laptop computers, which contained approximately 38,000 files discussing 
FARC strategy, operations planning, meetings, etc. The computer files were later 
reviewed by Interpol and declared to be authentic.42 The records seized by the 
Colombian military detail the extent of the support the FARC was receiving in 2008 from 
the Venezuelan government of President Chavez. These documents are extremely 
relevant to the understanding of the crime-terror nexus because they provide insight and 
understanding of the support these violent sub-national groups are receiving from nation 
states. 
Another weakness of the writing on the FARC is the lack of more recent open 
source writings about its criminal activities. While a few books were written about the 
                                                 
40 Janes IHS Global, “SECURITY, Colombia,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, February 10, 
2014, 19. 
41 Leech, The FARC: The Longest Insurgency. 
42 Jon-Paul N. Maddaloni, “An Analysis of the FARC in Colombia: Breaking the Frame of FM 3–24” 
(monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff 
College, 2009). 
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subject, information is lacking about what has happened since the death of Hugo Chavez, 
and when Nicolas Maduro Moros became the President of Venezuela. For more up–to-
date information, it is necessary to rely on news media articles and websites, such as 
InsightCrime.com.  
3. North America and the Mexican Transcontinental Criminal 
Organizations  
A great deal has been written in recent years about the MTCOs and the violent 
crimes they are committing. A number of books, news media articles, websites, and blogs 
have been written detailing both the events and violence occurring inside Mexico. Much 
also has been written about the variety of criminal activity the MTCOs are engaging in, 
which covers nearly every type violent crime. For example, the MTCOs not only engage 
in drug smuggling, but also murder, robberies, kidnapping for ransom, human trafficking, 
extortion, and bribery, which are also regular activities of the cartels. The problem and 
threat posed by the MTCOs is extensive. Not one book, magazine article, government 
document, website, or blog from a credible source can be found that would suggest it is 
not the case. The extensive threat posed by the MTCOs seems to be a universally 
accepted fact. 
A number of books have been written that discuss in detail the types of activities 
the MTCOs engage in regularly. Some of these books were written by people who served 
as military intelligence analysts, such as Jennifer Hesterman,43 and Sylvia Longmire.44 
Both have retired and now use their expertise to write independently about the extent of 
the threat posed by the MTCOs. The three books written by these two individuals are 
relevant to the understanding of the crime-terror nexus, and the threat it now poses to 
U.S. homeland security. All three books illustrate how the U.S. government has failed to 
develop an effective border strategy, which leaves the country vulnerable to illegal 
immigration, terrorism, and transnational crime.  
                                                 
43 Hesterman, The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels, Organized 
Crime, and Terror Groups, 329. 
44 Sylvia Longmire, Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico’s Drug Wars (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011); Sylvia Longmire, Border Insecurity: Why Big Money, Fences, and Drones Aren’t 
Making Us Safer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
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Other books written about the MTCOs focus on how these violent sub-national 
groups pose a multi-dimensional threat to U.S. national security. For example, Paul 
Rexton Kan’s book entitled, Cartels at War: Mexico’s Drug Fueled Violence and the 
Threat to U.S. National Security, is extremely relevant to the research into the crime-
terror nexus. It looks at not just the level of violence occurring in Mexico, but also breaks 
down how the MTCOs are a tactical threat to U.S. homeland security practitioners 
because of their willingness to attack both border agents and first responders. Kan also 
describes how the nexus of crime and terrorism threatens U.S. interests both regionally 
and globally, by undermining U.S. efforts in the War on Terror. The literature about the 
MTCOs that covers the multi-dimensional nature of the threat they pose (borders in, and 
borders out), provides valuable information of how the crime-terror nexus is now a threat 
to U.S. national security beyond the shared border with Mexico.  
One of the problems with the literature on the MTCOs is a distinct lack of 
primary sources on the subject. One exception is a book written by British journalist, Ioan 
Grillow, which contains hundreds of interviews with former cartel members and provides 
detailed accounts of their activities on behalf of the MTCOs.45 This book is perhaps as 
close as might be found to a primary source of information about the activities of the 
MTCOs, as cartel members have not written any manifestos. Since it is a primary source 
of information, it is relevant to the understanding of the crime-terror nexus since it 
provides firsthand knowledge of the heterogeneous nature of the activities of these 
violent sub-national groups.  
Also, a number of websites provide relevant and appropriate insights into the 
threat posed by the MTCOs. For example, The Small Wars Journal (SWJ), is a website 
written by a group of former military subject matter experts that covers a number of small 
conflicts occurring around the world. SWJ dedicates one part of its website entitled, “El 
Centro” to the conflict occurring in Mexico between the MTCOs and the Government of 
Mexico. It has written extensively about the conflict, and provides analysis, which is 
relevant to the understanding of the crime-terrorism nexus. For example, the SWJ wrote 
                                                 
45 Ioan Grillo, El Narco: Inside Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency (New York: Bloomsbury, 2011). 
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an article that discusses the use of the counter insurgency (COIN) as a tactic for defeating 
with the MTCOs.46 Another website, which provides open source intelligence analysis, 
called “In-Sight Crime,” also has a specific section of its website dedicated solely to the 
crime occurring in Mexico. It also covers the MTCO’s activities in the Northern Triangle 
of Central America, and South America. Both of these websites add to the understanding 
of the crime-terror nexus because they are focused on events occurring with the MTCOs 
throughout Latin America, and therefore, expand the knowledge of the threat occurring in 
other parts of the world. 
In addition, a number of news media outlets cover the MTCOs and their activities. 
For example, the New York Times dedicates a part of its website to the coverage of the 
MTCOs, as do the LA Times, Fox News, the Washington Times, and the Huffington Post 
as well. All these media outlets provide coverage of recent events, but also an archive of 
their own reporting on the MTCOs. These are good sources of information about recent 
events related to the crime-terror nexus and help provide a big picture of the extent of the 
problem posed by the crime-terrorism nexus. 
In terms of the body of literature regarding the threat posed by the MTCOs, a 
large amount of information is available, and more is being written every day. Therefore, 
in terms of scale, no shortage of information is available, and new information is 
becoming available from a variety of different sources on a regular basis. What all these 
sources, and others not mentioned by name, do when taken as a whole, is detail a 
significant, and growing threat posed by the MTCOs. They detail how the threat from the 
MTCOs continues to increase, and now threatens to destabilize parts of Central America, 
and undermine the U.S. War on Terror. 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
After looking at the whole of the literature available in these two categories, it is 
easy to see where consensus and disagreement occurs among the experts. Generally, the 
consensus is that the crime-terrorism nexus constitutes a significant and growing threat to 
                                                 
46 John Maier, “Applying Counterinsurgency Doctrine as a Strategy to Defeat the Mexican Cartels,” 
The Small Wars Journal, October 27, 2013. 
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the U.S. homeland security, as well as a threat to U.S. regional interests, and threatens to 
undermine U.S. efforts in the War on Terror. However, much disagreement does occur 
about how to define the actions of these violent sub-national groups, and whether their 
activities constitute acts of crime or acts of terrorism. What these gaps in research or 
disagreements suggest is that more research needs to be done to determine both the extent 
of the threat posed by the crime-terrorism nexus, and the types of challenges they pose 
the U.S. homeland security practitioners.  
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III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE
CRIME-TERROR NEXUS 
This chapter, as the title suggests, covers the background and history of the crime-
terror nexus. It begins with a look at the early communist writings of people, such as Karl 
Marx, Frederick Engels, and Vladimir Lenin. It continues with a look at the debate that 
occurred during the Cold War era around the question of whether the Soviet Union was 
actively fomenting international terrorism. Then, it ends with a review of information that 
came to light following the collapse of Soviet Union. 
A. THE INFLUENCE OF EARLY COMMUNISTS ON THE CRIME-
TERROR NEXUS 
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels wrote the Manifesto of the Communist Party, 
colloquially known as the Communist Manifesto, in 1848. In the first chapter of their 
magnum opus, Marx and Engels describe the conflict between the different classes of a 
modern industrial society.47 They describe the exploitation of the proletariat, or working 
classes, by the bourgeoisie, or middle classes, which will lead to a revolution and the 
eventual rise of the proletariat.48 Of particular interest to the discussion of the crime-
terror nexus is how Marx and Engels describe the third class of people, the 
“lumpenproletariat,” who Marx and Engels describe as the “dangerous class, the social 
scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of the old society.”49 
Marx and Engels believed the lumpenproletariat would be “swept up in the revolution.”50 
However, they pointed out the lumpenproletariat’s social conditions “prepare it far more 
for the part of bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.”51 In other words, Marx and Engels 
believed the lumpenproletariat would be of little use during a revolution for anything 
more than creating “reactionary intrigue.” Still, Marx and Engels end the Communist 






Manifesto saying the goals of communism “can only be attained by the violent overthrow 
of all existing social conditions.”52 
Both Marx and Engels would expand upon their descriptions of the 
lumpenproletariat in later writings. In the Class Struggles of France, 1848–1850, Marx 
would go on to describe the lumpenproletariat as “a recruiting ground for thieves and 
criminals of all kinds, living on the crumbs of society, people without a definite trade, 
vagabonds.”53 Engels, much harsher in his descriptions, stated, “The lumpenproletariat, 
this scum of the depraved elements of all classes, which established headquarters in the 
big cities, is the worst of all possible allies. This rabble is absolutely venal and absolutely 
brazen.”54 However, Marx appears to have disagreed with Engels with regard to the 
revolutionary value of the lumpenproletariat. In The Class Struggles in France, Marx 
foreshadows the later writings of several communists when he describes the young 
members of the lumpenproletariat as, “thoroughly malleable, as capable of the most 
heroic deeds and the most exalted sacrifices as of the basest banditry and the foulest 
corruption.”55 From this last quote, it appears that Marx believed the criminal activity of 
the lumpenproletariat could be useful in creating chaos, disorder, and general mayhem, 
which could be of value as a subversive activity during a time of communist revolution. 
Vladimir Lenin would later express his belief that the criminal acts could be 
useful during a time of revolution. In his October 16, 1905 letter “To the Combat 
Committee of the St. Petersburg Committee,” Lenin encouraged young revolutionaries to 
engage in criminal behavior on behalf of the revolution.56 Lenin wrote, “Some may at 
once undertake to kill a spy or blow up a police station, others to raid a bank, to 
confiscate funds for the insurrection, others again may drill or prepare plans for localities, 
                                                 
52 Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party. 
53 Robert C. Tucker and Karl Marx, The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), 
788. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels; Selected Works in One Volume 
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56 Lenin, Selected Works in Three Volumes. Uniform Title: Works. Selections. English. 1970.  
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etc.”57 Lenin, not only understood Marx’s view that violent crime could useful in 
creating chaos, disorder, and general mayhem during a time of revolution, he actively 
encouraged revolutionaries to engage in violent crime, such as robbing banks to fund the 
insurrection. According to Ray S. Cline, the former Director of the Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research at the Central Intelligence Agency, “Lenin proposed and substantiated a 
guideline aimed at creating a united front from all anti-imperialist forces in nations 
fighting for liberation from colonial and semi-colonial oppression. The goal always is 
destabilization in preparation for revolution and Communist political rule.”58 The 
aforementioned quotations demonstrate that the founders of Marxism-Leninism believed 
that acts of both terrorism and violent crime are permissible subversive methods for 
achieving revolutionary goals. 
B. THE COLD WAR AND THE CRIME-TERROR NEXUS 
Following World War II, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union established 
two schools with the goal of facilitating subversive activities. First, in 1952, the 
Chairman of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin, established the 
Lenin Institute in Moscow, officially known as the “Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute of the 
CC CPSU.” The purpose of the school was to train select members of third world and 
western communist parties “in propaganda and psychological warfare, armed and 
unarmed combat, and guerrilla warfare—the core curriculum in international 
terrorism.”59  
Later, in 1958, the Premier of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, founded 
Moscow’s Patrice Lumumba Friendship University to indoctrinate and train potential 
revolutionaries and terrorists from the third world who are not communist party 
members.60 More specialized training in terrorism was provided at training bases in 
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58 Cline and Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection. 
59 Ibid. 
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locations, such as Baku, Odessa, Simferopol, Tashkent, and in the suburbs of Moscow.61 
These locations were used to teach irregular or asymmetrical warfare tactics including 
“the use of explosives, mining of transportation routes, commando field tactics, and the 
combat capabilities of shoulder fired rockets.”62 
On January 6, 1961, Khrushchev presented a report to the subcommittee of the 
Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party called, “Higher Party Schools.”63 
Khrushchev summarized his opinion that a nuclear war with the West was almost 
unthinkable. However, he explained as an alternative to nuclear war, the opportunity 
existed to undermine the stability of the pro-western governments in third world nations, 
especially those countries rich in natural resources deemed crucial to western 
industrialized nations.64 Khrushchev suggested the Soviet Union could achieve its goal of 
destabilizing pro-western governments by training and arming communist revolutionary 
movements to engage in “sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism.”65 The broader 
strategic goal would be to weaken western democracies.66 
On July 29, 1961, KGB chairman Aleksandr Shelepin proposed a new and 
aggressive global strategy against the west to Khrushchev.67 This new strategy, according 
to Shelepin, was intended to “create circumstances in different areas of the world, which 
would assist in diverting the attention and forces of the United States and its allies, and 
would tie them down during the settlement of the question of a German peace treaty and 
West Berlin’s proposal.”68 The plan, as outlined by Shelepin, called for the use of 
national liberation movements around the world to secure an advantage in the East-West 
struggle and to “activate by the means available to the KGB, armed uprisings against pro-
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Western reactionary governments.”69 Shelepin’s strategy specifically targeted, 
“reactionary regimes in the Main Adversary’s own backyard in Central America,” 
beginning with Nicaragua. Shelepin recommended the KGB coordinate a “revolutionary 
front” in collaboration with the Cubans and the Sandinistas. According to Christopher 
Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, the authors of The Sword and the Shield, Shelepin’s plan 
was approved as a Central Committee directive on August 1, 1961.70 
Evidence that Shelepin’s plan was enacted can be seen in January 1966. Fidel 
Castro hosted a series of international conferences of extremists in Havana, Cuba during 
1966–68.71 The “Tricontinental Conference” was attended by 513 delegates of 83 radical 
movements and communist parties from all over the third world.72 Author Claire Sterling 
described the event saying, “The likes of it had never been seen since the Bolshevik 
Revolution of 1917, and the world would never be the same.”73 The general declaration 
of the Tricontinental Conference promoted close collaboration between “Socialist 
countries,” meaning communist nations, and “national liberation movements,” including 
“democratic workers’ and students’ movements” in Europe and North America.74 Its goal 
of the conference was to promote “a global revolutionary strategy to counter the global 
strategy of American Imperialism.”75 The Tricontinental Conference was a well-
organized attempt to create subversive activities around the world “to secure an 
advantage in East-West struggle,” just as Shelepin had recommended.76 
Further evidence of Soviet support for subversive activities was revealed in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 during a time that became known as “the Prague Spring,” when a 
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Czechoslovakian General, named Jan Sejna, defected to the United States. Sejna was 
carrying documentation he had acquired during his 20-year service as a military advisor 
to the Central Committee of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party. The documentation 
provided proof that by 1964, the Soviet Union had increased spending in support of 
terrorism abroad by 1,000%.77 Sejna’s documentation also revealed, “the secret services 
of all the Communist bloc countries were involved in recruiting spies and infiltrating the 
worlds nascent left-wing terrorist movements; special guerrilla training schools had been 
set up in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Cuba for ‘selected terrorists from all over 
the world.’”78 Stated differently, Sejna provided evidence that the Soviet Union was 
supporting terrorism and subversive activities through the use of the other communist 
bloc nations.  
In June 1969, Carlos Marighella, a Brazillian Communist, wrote Minimanual do 
Guerrilheiro Urbano or in English, Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla. Marighella listed 
14 techniques of urban guerrilla warfare in the Minimanual, which include “attack, entry 
or break-in, occupation, ambush, tactical street fighting, strike or other interruptional 
work, desertion and appropriation, or expropriation of arms, ammunition, and explosives, 
liberating prisoners, executions, kidnapping, sabotage, terrorism, armed propaganda, and 
the ‘war of nerves.’”79 Marighella describes the two functions of the urban guerrillas are 
to liquidate “high and low ranking officers of both the armed forces and police, and to 
expropriate arms and goods belonging to the government, the capitalists, the landowners, 
and the imperialists.”80 Marighella goes on to provide a very specific list of targets for 
kidnapping, which includes “policemen, spies, political figures, and notorious enemies 
endangering the revolution, furthermore, non-political but well-known figures from the 
world of arts, sports, and other activities.”81 Marighella’s Minimanual of the Urban 
Guerilla is another example of a communist leader espousing the use of violent crime and 
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terrorism as an asymmetrical tactic to promote low intensity conflict designed to subvert 
legitimate governments to seize power.  
C. MEXICO AS A TARGET OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 
The Soviet Union spent nearly 15 years in an effort to destabilize Mexico 
beginning in 1959, with the “wild-cat railway strikes.”82 This destabilization was an 
attempt to disrupt the 1968 Olympic Games, which were held in Mexico City, by 
orchestrating riots and civil disobedience cities throughout Mexico.83 However, the effort 
failed.84 Undeterred, the Soviet Union initiated a more concerted effort and well-planned 
KGB operation to instigate a civil war in Mexico that would result in the violent 
overthrow its government.  
In March 1971, the Soviet Union enacted “a plan to turn Mexico into another 
Vietnam.”85 The plan, however, went awry and became public knowledge when, 
according to author Stephen Possney, “Mexico suddenly expelled five Soviet Embassy 
officials, including the charge d’affaires, the ranking Soviet representative in Mexico.”86 
The expulsions were the political fallout that followed the arrest of a group of communist 
revolutionaries by the Mexican government.87 When Mexican authorities discovered the 
plan, 19 members of the group known as the Movimiento de Acción Revolucionaria 
(Revolutionary Action Movement) (MAR) were arrested and jailed for robbery, murder, 
and attempted insurrection.88 The group was recruited, trained, and equipped by the 
Soviet Union and North Korea.89 The leader of MAR, Armando Carrillo, as well as 10 
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other members of the group, had been recruited by the KGB while they were students at 
Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow.90 
Following their training in communist doctrine in Moscow, several dozen 
members of MAR received training at a camp 35 miles from Pyongyang, North Korea. 
Their training included “instruction in arson, ambush, assassination, the use of explosives 
and small arms, karate, communications and other guerrilla and terrorist specialties.”91 
The training even included fire and maneuver exercises where the members of MAR 
went head-to-head against units of the regular North Korean army.92 
The incident was a public relations disaster for the Soviet Union. The existence of 
MAR, their goals to subvert the Mexican government, and the fact the group was 
supported by the Soviet Union were widely publicized throughout Latin America.93 
However, the incident did not stop the Soviet Union from fomenting violent crime and 
terrorism as a means of subverting pro-Western governments. Instead, the Soviets 
employed proxies to engage in their subversive activities. In May 1975, Brian Crozier 
described Soviet support for subversive activities for the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on 
International Security stating, “It was a very sophisticated policy, which amounted to 
this: the orthodox parties everywhere could denounce the extremism of the left and 
advance their own credentials as the alternative government and the party of order; 
whereas Soviet assistance to terrorist groups, including some ideologically incompatible 
with the Moscow line, could continue on a clandestine basis.”94 
Communist nations did not give up on the idea of targeting Mexico after the 
Soviet Union’s failed attempt to subvert the Mexican government. To the contrary, 
evidence suggests Mexico remained high on the list of targets for communist subversion. 
For example, in 1986, Armando Valladares, a Cuban writer and former political prisoner 
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of Fidel Castro, told O Estado de Sao Paulo, a Brazilian newspaper, that “Brazil ranked 
only second only to Mexico as the most important country for Castro’s subversive 
plans.”95  
95 Hudson, Castro’s America Department: Coordinating Cuba’s Support for Marxist-Leninist 
Violence in the Americas, 73. 
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IV. CASE STUDY #1—HEZBOLLAH 
This case study begins with a brief overview of the background and origins of 
Hezbollah. This section is not intended to be a complete history of Hezbollah, which 
would require extensive work beyond the limits of this thesis. Instead, the background 
focuses on the origins and stated objectives of the organization as stated in their 1985 
open letter, and the new Hezbollah Manifesto of 2009. The primary point of this exercise 
is to familiarize the reader with the organization’s stated goals and objectives, and how 
they have changed over the course of time. 
A. THE ORIGINS OF HEZBOLLAH AND THE OPEN LETTER OF 1985 
The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was firing Katyusha rockets into 
Israel from Southern Lebanon. On June 6, 1982, the Israeli military invaded Lebanon 
with the intentions of destroying the PLO.96 The Shi’a population of Southern Lebanon 
was never the target of the invasion. However, Ehud Barak, the form Israeli Prime 
Minister said in 2006, “When we entered Lebanon… there was no Hezbollah. We were 
accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shi’a in the south. It was our presence 
there that created Hezbollah.”97 As Barak’s comments suggest, Israel’s long occupation 
of Lebanon (1982–2000) led to “Hezbollah’s Islamic revolution and led to its military, 
political, and social buildup.”98 
Hezbollah, or “Party of God,” is a Shi’a Muslim organization based in Lebanon 
founded in 1982, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.99 Initially, Hezbollah was an 
amalgamation of a small radical groups inspired by Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution.100 
The U.S. Department of State designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in 1997. 
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The United Kingdom designated Hezbollah’s military wing as a terrorist organization in 
2000, and the European Union followed suit in 2013. 
It should be noted that Hezbollah did not publicly announce its existence until 
February 16, 1985, when it published “An Open Letter: The Hezbollah Program.”101 The 
open letter stated that Hezbollah had three objectives: (1) to rid Lebanon of all colonial 
entities, namely the United States, and France, (2) to bring the “Phalangists,” or members 
of a Lebanese paramilitary organization, to justice for crimes they had allegedly 
committed against Muslims and Christians, and (3) to allow the Lebanese people the 
liberty to choose their own form of government.102 
In the open letter of 1985, Hezbollah calls on Christians not to be deceived into 
believing they (Hezbollah) seek vengeance against Christians. In fact, the open letter 
says, “continue to live in our midst without anybody even thinking to trouble you.”103 
While the open letter does call upon Christians of Lebanon to convert to Islam, it implies 
a level of tolerance towards Christians and encourages them to “maintain your ties with 
the Muslims and don’t take part in any activity against them.”104 
Towards Israel, the open letter expresses a refusal to recognize the existence of 
“the Zionist entity,” which they saw as the “vanguard of the United States in our Muslim 
world.”105 As author Joseph Alagam has pointed out, “From a principal and doctrinal 
perspective, Hizbullah’s political ideology seeks to restore Arab-Muslin historical rights 
in Palestine and is totally against any ceasefire, truce, land for peace, peace negotiations, 
or normalization of relations with Israel.”106 In fact, the open letter states for Hezbollah 
the struggle will end “only when this entity is obliterated.”107 
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Regarding the Soviet Union and the United States, communism and capitalism, 
Hezbollah rejected both outright by saying “both are incapable of laying the foundations 
for a just society.”108 Hezbollah also rejected the United Nations Interim force in 
Lebanon, which it saw as creating a buffer zone for the protection of Israel. In short, the 
open letter spells out Hezbollah’s rejection of any foreign intervention in Lebanon. 
B. THE NEW HEZBOLLAH MANIFESTO OF 2009 
In November 2009, Hezbollah released a new Manifesto, publicly stating the 
organization’s strategic objectives for the first time since the open letter of 1985. Many of 
the objects remained the same, such as resistance to the hegemony of the United States, 
and resistance to the “Zionist entity.” These changes, as Joseph Alagha observed, 
“illustrate Hizbullah’s serious attempts to aim at identity construction and reconstruction, 
since over the years its ideology, political strategy, and future outlook have undergone 
drastic and dramatic changes.” However, two notable differences also occurred between 
the 1985 open letter and the 2009 manifesto, which are important in understanding the 
crime-terror nexus.  
First, in comparing the two documents, while the rejection of American 
hegemony and capitalism remains the main themes between both documents, it is 
important to note no reference appears concerning the rejection of the Soviet Union or 
communism. While obviously the Soviet Union does not exist as a world superpower as 
it did in 1985, communism remained a prominent social, political, and economic 
ideology in 2009, and was practiced widely in different parts of the world then, as it is 
today. The absence of a rejection of communism in the 2009 manifesto, while 
maintaining the original rejections of capitalism, suggests a strategic shift on the part of 
Hezbollah’s leadership towards communist nations, and at least tolerance toward, if not 
an absolute embrace of communist ideology.  
The second notable difference between the two documents that is of interest in 
discussions relating to the crime-terror nexus is in the section of the 2009 manifesto 
entitled, “Section 7—Lebanon and International Relations.” The document details 
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Hezbollah’s opinions regarding European-Arab relations. The document goes on to say, 
“On the other hand, we look at the experience of independence and liberation that rejects 
hegemony in the countries of Latin America with a lot of respect, attention, and 
appreciation. We see vast intersection platforms between their project and the project of 
resistance movements in our region, which leads to constructing a more just and balanced 
international system.”109  
This nod to the resistance movements of Latin America came at a time when the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, which has been Hezbollah’s state sponsor since its founding, 
was enjoying improved relationships with many Latin American countries. For example, 
with the help of former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Iran had entered into trade 
agreements with several Latin American countries that make up part of the Bolivarian 
Alliance, such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. However, Iran had also 
entered into trade agreements with Brazil and Argentina, which are not part of the 
Bolivarian Alliance. In fact, Iran’s trade with Brazil alone increased fivefold between 
2002 and 2007 going from $2 billion to $10 billion in just five years.110 These improved 
diplomatic and economic relations allowed Iran to nearly double the number of embassies 
from six prior to 2004 to 11 in 2009.111 Also, in March 2012, during the U.S. Southern 
Command (SOUTHCOM) posture statement before the House Armed Services 
Committee, General Douglas Fraser, the former commander, said Iran supported at least 
36 Shi’a Islamic cultural centers in Latin America.112 Then, in March 2015, General John 
Kelly, the current SOUTHCOM commander, told the same committee, “Iran has 
established more than 80 ‘cultural centers’ in a region with an extremely small Muslim 
population.”113 According to these reports, the number of Islamic cultural centers has 
increased 55 percent in just three years. 
                                                 
109 Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents from the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto, 48. 
110 Fleischman, Latin America in the Post-Chávez Era: The Security Threat to the United States, 277. 
111 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle 
East and Africa, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Iran and Hezbollah in the Western 




It is worth noting that Hezbollah has maintained a presence in Latin America for 
some time, particularly in the tri-border region where the Brazilian, Paraguayan, and 
Argentine frontiers meet. However, Hezbollah’s growing relationship with the Bolivarian 
Alliance opens the door for expanded influence not just in South America, but also in 
Central America and the Caribbean Basin. Also, the suggestion of an intersection 
between Latin American countries, and “the resistance movements in our region” was not 
only stated in the 2009 Manifesto. Hassan Nasrallah also mentioned it during the press 
conference on November 30, 2009, following the release of the new manifesto. Nasrallah 
would later say, “‘It is not our fault that the resistance in Lebanon has come up with a 
military fighting school others can benefit from in Yemen, in Latin America, even the 
“Israeli” may learn and benefit from it, this is not a condemnation to us, but a 
condemnation to all those who do not benefit from our fighting school to liberate their 
land and restore the holy places.’”114 Nasrallah’s statement suggests the nature of the 
relationship between Latin American resistance movements and Hezbollah goes beyond 
economic cooperation, and fund raising, and implies a military relationship exists. Also, 
it is worth noting that Hezbollah’s strategic shift towards the social-democratic nations of 
the Bolivarian Alliance gives Hezbollah access to Central America and the Caribbean 
Basin, is in keeping with former KGB Chairman Aleksandr Shelepin’s 1961 suggestion 
of targeting “the Main Adversary’s own backyard in Central America,” which was 
described in more detail in the first chapter of this thesis.115 From Central America and 
the Caribbean Basin, Hezbollah could engage in a variety of nefarious activities 
throughout the region.  
C. HEZBOLLAH AND TERRORISM 
In terms of terroristic activities, little disagreement occurs that Hezbollah was 
engaged in acts of terrorism in the 1980s. One of the most notable incidents involved the 
hijacking of TWA flight 847, which was traveling from Athens, Greece to Rome, Italy, 
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but was forced by the hijackers to land at the Beirut, Lebanon.116 The hijackers, both 
Hezbollah operatives, murdered a U.S. Navy diver, Robert Stethem, and dumped his 
body on the tarmac of the airport. Both hijackers remain on FBI’s “Most Wanted” list.117  
Another notable terrorist incident involving Hezbollah involved the kidnapping 
and murder of U.S. Marine Colonel Higgins, the chief of an unarmed observer group 
attached to a United Nations truce-monitoring force in Lebanon, on February 17, 
1988.118 Higgins was tortured and eventually hanged to death on July 31, 1989.119 His 
remains were “dumped on a dusty street in Beirut on Dec. 23, 1991—the day he and his 
wife would have celebrated their 14th wedding anniversary.”120 It should be noted, 
however, that while Hezbollah actively engaged in kidnapping operations during the 
initial years following its formation, it rarely uses the tactic today. The most recent 
example of a kidnapping by Hezbollah involved the cross-border kidnapping of two 
Israeli soldiers, which preceded the July 2006 war.121  
Hezbollah has also been linked to the March 1992 terrorist attack on the Israeli 
embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, which left 29 people dead and an additional 242 
people wounded.122 The Islamic Jihad Organization claimed responsibility for the attack 
in retaliation for the assassination of Sheikh Abbas al-Mussawi, the Secretary General of 
Hezbollah, in February 1992.123 Hezbollah has also been linked to the 1994 car bombing 
of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires, known as the Asociación Mutual Israelita 
Argentina (AMIA), which killed 85 people, most of them Jews.124 These two bombings 
                                                 
116 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History.  
117 Ibid. 
118 Bethanne Kelly Patrick, “Col. William R. ‘Rich’ Higgins,” Military Advantage, 2015, 
http://www.military.com/Content/MoreContent?file=ML_higgins_bkp. 
119 Ihsan A. Hijazi, “Group in Beirut Says it Hanged U.S. Colonel; 2D Threat Issued; Bush Convenes 
Security Panel; Videotape Released,” New York Times, August 1, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/ 
01/world/group-beirut-says-it-hanged-us-colonel-2d-threat-issued-bush-convenes-security.html?pagewant 
ed=all. 
120 Bethanne Kelly Patrick, “Col. William R. ‘Rich’ Higgins,” 1. 
121 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, Hizbullah.  
122 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History. 
123 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, Hizbullah. 
124 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History. 
37 
stood as the two most deadly terrorist attacks in the Western Hemisphere prior to the 
attacks of September 11, 2001.125 
D. HEZBOLLAH AND CRIME 
According to several sources, Hezbollah has been involved with drug trafficking 
for some time, both in Lebanon and elsewhere. However, Hezbollah has not limited its 
criminal activities solely to drug trafficking. It has maintained a presence in the tri-border 
area of South America for fundraising, and has developed links in the area with 
international criminals engaged in weapons trafficking, money laundering, counterfeit 
documents, and the sale of counterfeit merchandise.  
For example, on September 12, 2001, Paraguayan police conducted a raid of 
Assad Ahmad Barakat’s small business, “Casa Apollo,” in Cuidad del Este.126 Barakat 
was Hezbollah’s chief fundraiser in the tri-border area who ran an extensive network of 
legal and illegal financial ventures. Although Barakat was not arrested during the raid, 
the police seized several boxes containing financial records. The financial records 
contained detailed information of monthly money transfers to the Middle East totaling a 
quarter of a million dollars.127 In addition, the seized boxes contained detailed 
descriptions of 30 different attacks against Israeli targets in the Middle East. The 
Paraguayan authorities alleged the financial records indicated Barakat had transferred 
half a million dollars to bank accounts in Canada, Chile and the United States, and an 
equal sum in bank transfers were also made directly to accounts in Lebanon. a letter from 
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was also found among the financial records. In the 
letter, Nasrallah congratulated Barakat’s efforts to raise funds for Hezbollah, and he 
acknowledged having received more than $3.5 million dollars as a result of those 
efforts.128 
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Also, increasing evidence suggests that Hezbollah has developed a so-called 
strategic alliance with the FARC, which raises the likelihood of its engagement in drug 
trafficking. 
For example, Hezbollah’s involvement in drug trafficking in Latin America was 
brought to the forefront again in July 2011, during hearings of the U.S. House of 
Representatives sub-committee on counter-terrorism and intelligence. Evidence was 
presented that supported previous allegations that the Hezbollah was raising funds 
through drug trafficking in both Colombia and Mexico, which was later used in support 
of their operations in the Middle East. While the U.S. government has never made public 
the evidence proving a link between Hezbollah, Colombia, and Mexico, evidence did 
surface following the arrest of Walid Makled, a Venezuelan drug-trafficker known as “El 
Arabe” due to his Syrian ancestry.129 Makled alleged that several politically connected 
members of Venezuela’s government were involved “in cocaine trafficking and holding 
fundraising operations for Hezbollah and Colombian FARC guerillas.”130 The 41-year-
old claimed he paid off as many as 40 Venezuelan generals, five members of the 
Venezuelan National Assembly, and the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), of 
which both Hugo Chavez, and current Venezuelan President Nichols Maduro were 
members. Makled also claimed he had provided the PSUV with campaign cash totaling 
more than two million dollars.131 
The DEA had evidence that Makled was shipping an estimated 10 tons of cocaine 
a month from Venezuela to the United States.132 At the time of his arrest, Mekled was 
also suspected of murder in Venezuela. He promised to provide details of the connection 
between Hezbollah, the FARC, and the Venezuelan government only after he was 
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extradited to the United States.133 Some have suggested that Mekled’s motive for 
withholding the information he claimed to have was driven by a desire to avoid murder 
charges in Venezuela. Eventually, the Colombian government made the decision to 
approve Mekled’s extradition to Venezuela citing the fact he was wanted by Venezuela 
on more serious charges of murder, but only on charges of drug trafficking by the United 
States.134 
Although Walid Meklid may have been motivated by a desire to avoid more 
serious charges in Venezuela, strong evidence still suggests a tie exists between 
Hezbollah and drug trafficking. For example, on August 20, 2014, Michele M. Leonhart, 
the former DEA administrator, announced the seizure of $150 million in connection with 
a Hezbollah money laundering case dating from 2011. According to Leonhart, Hezbollah 
made use of the financial system in the United States for laundering profits from its drug 
trafficking operations.135 
Also, in March 2014, during a public speaking engagement in Washington, DC, 
the former DEA Director of Operations, Michael Braun, presented evidence of 
Hezbollah’s engagement in drug trafficking. Braun indicated that in the last five years, 
“We (meaning the DEA) have seen Hezbollah go from dealing a couple of hundred 
pounds of cocaine to dealing a couple of hundred tons of cocaine.”136 This statement by 
Mr. Braun is significant in that it suggests two things. First, for Hezbollah to make such a 
significant change in the volume of drugs it is trafficking means the organization made a 
strategic shift. Second, this strategic shift may have been brought about by financial 
sanctions put in place against Iran by the International Community for the Islamic 
Republic’s pursuit of nuclear technology. 
Besides Hezbollah’s drug trafficking activities, there are also indications it is 
engaging in human smuggling in different parts of Latin America. For example, on 
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September 2012, Rafic Labboun, a U.S. citizen and resident of the San Francisco Bay 
Area was arrested in Mexico for smuggling Hezbollah operatives across the Mexican 
border from Belize.137 At the time, Labboun had in his possession a fake Belizean 
driver’s license, birth certificate, and passport, all of which he had acquired in less than 
72 hours of his arrest.138 Labboun was also a member of the Shi’a Association Bay Area 
(SABA) mosque where he served as the spiritual leader. His criminal record also 
indicated he was convicted in 2009 of credit card fraud for illegal financial transactions 
designed to raise money for Hezbollah.139 This case is particularly troubling in terms of 
U.S. border security because it demonstrates how easily legal documents can be obtained 
in some Central American countries. 
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V. CASE STUDY #2—REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF 
COLOMBIA  
This case study is not an exhaustive history; rather, it provides an analysis 
overview of the relevant issues related to the FARC. This section is not intended to be a 
complete history of the FARC, which would require extensive work beyond the limits of 
this thesis. Instead, the background focuses on the origins and stated objectives of the 
organization, and the relationship between the FARC, communism, and how it relates to 
the crime-terror nexus. This case study provides the reader with an essential 
understanding of the organization’s stated goals and external relationships, and how it has 
employed both crime and terrorism in an effort to subvert the government of Colombia, 
and obtain its ultimate objective of seizing power. 
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC is a Marxist insurgency 
in Colombia. The FARC claim the date its movement began was on May 27, 1964.140 On 
that day, Colombian government forces attacked a rural community known as 
Marquetalia, which had become a communist enclave, with the aim of bringing the area 
back under state control.141 While the operation, known as “Plan Unite” was successful, 
several guerillas escaped capture, and later formed a guerrilla movement known as the 
“Southern Bloc.”142 Two years later, in 1966, after sufficient time to regroup, the 
guerrillas formed the FARC under the leadership of Manuel Marulanda Velez, although it 
still retained May 27, 1964 as the date it was founded.143 Author James J. Brittain 
explained, “Marquetalia became the turning point in Colombia’s revolutionary struggle. 
Immediately following the campaign, a significant segment of the rural population moved 
to support the guerrillas.”144 The FARC’s stated objective, in 1966, was to “overthrow 
the ruling order in Colombia and drive out what it perceived to be U.S. imperialist 
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interests from Latin America, while simultaneously establishing a Marxist or at least a 
socialist government.”145 
It is important to note that communism had existed in Colombia for many years 
prior to the founding of FARC. According to Brittain, “Some sources have dated the 
roots of the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) even earlier, as left-wing workers’ 
collectives began to mobilize around Marxist ideals during the 1910s.”146 Thus, 
Colombian Marxist communism had deep roots in Colombia, even predating the 1917 
Russian Revolution. 
During these early years of FARC’s existence, the organization served as the 
military arm of the PCC. For its part, the PCC did little to resolve the issue. In fact, 
according to Brittain, the PCC acknowledged many forms of struggle were needed to 
achieve political change in Colombia, “including armed struggle.”147 The organization 
received both strategic direction and funding from the communist party leadership in 
Colombia.  
Marulanda also stressed the relationship between FARC and the PCC when he 
explained that FARC did not wish to influence the communist party, but would instead 
always be guided by the principles of the party.148 The FARC’s ties to communism are 
important to the discussion of the crime-terror nexus because Marx and Engels, and later 
Lenin, advocated the use of both crime and terrorism, which would create chaos and 
disorder, as a means to subvert a government and allow communists to seize power. 
During the 1970s, the FARC began to grow and build strength mostly in the small 
rural communities where the rule of law was weak due to a lack of centralized 
government. One technique it was successful in using to gain support in these rural 
communities was to establish “public order commissions” to impose their own form of 
law and order, which usually targeted petty criminals, or even at times perpetrator of 
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domestic violence.149 The use of the “public order commissions” gave the FARC a way 
to increase its influence and span of control in rural villages and towns, which helped it 
expand its base of support.150 
In 1978, Colombian President Julio Cesar Turbay was elected with a mandate to 
restore order to the state. He implemented a new national security statute that provided 
the military new police like authority to question, detain, and judge suspected criminals 
and guerrillas.151 The military abused its new authorities, and tortured and murdered 
hundreds of guerrillas and suspected guerrilla sympathizers.152 Human rights violations 
were rampant, as the government and military promoted the notion that the guerrillas 
could be defeated and success could be achieved through the practice of giving the 
guerrillas a taste of their own medicine. In other words, success could be achieved by 
fighting violent guerrillas using violent guerrilla tactics.  
Not surprisingly, widespread violence resulted in a loss of government legitimacy. 
The justification for the abuses that followed the National Security Statute was that the 
guerrillas were using the same tactics, and the violence would bring about a swift end to 
the war.153 Jon Maddaloni notes, “the Security Statute had an interesting effect on the 
FARC’s recruitment. Throughout this period they earned their reputation as a sort of 
David against the strong-arm tactics of the government Goliath. This perception 
increased their romantic rebel image and brought many younger volunteers to their 
ranks.”154 Leech points out, “the guerrillas have largely ignored more conventional 
avenues to transform society, such as elections and engagement with existing national 
institutions, and instead have worked at the community level and outside the parameters 
of the nation’s traditional power structures.”155 Petras noted, “The FARC was 
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implementing its revolutionary project on the local level without achieving regime 
change at the national level, although the latter remained a long-term objective of the 
guerrilla group’s revolution from below.”156 
On the political front, one of the most significant strategic decisions made by the 
leadership of FARC during the 1980s was a concerted effort to gain legitimacy for the 
FARC as a revolutionary government, or break away resistance movement.157 The FARC 
leadership believed this effort would give them a legal standing under the Geneva 
Conventions. The leadership argued that because FARC controlled territory, had an 
organized military, and sought to secede from Colombia, it deserved a similar legal 
standing as other declared independent republics.158 As if to emphasize the point, the 
FARC officially changed its name, adding Ejército del Pueblo or People’s Army, to be 
known as the FARC-EP. They also adopted hierarchical military rank structure, and 
mandated a more formal uniform policy.159  
In 1985, with the help of the Communist Party of Colombia, the FARC created a 
political party called Patriotic Union (UP).160 The idea was that the UP would help to 
carry the FARC’s message into urban areas, and get its political message out to the 
general population. When elections were held in March 1986, the UP won elections for 
24 provincial deputies and 275 municipal representatives at the local level.161 
Additionally, UP won the elections of four senators and four congressional 
representatives.162 It is particularly relevant to the discussion of the crime-terror nexus 
because it demonstrates that communists will participate in an electoral process while 
utilizing both crime and terrorism to create chaos, disorder, and havoc to subvert the 
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current government. In other words, it will present itself during a time of chaos, disorder, 
and havoc as a better alternative than the existing government structure.  
The reaction of the wealthy landowners and members of the conservative party 
was to form paramilitary organizations to target the guerrillas. The Colombian military 
either turned a blind eye to the activities of these groups, or worse, actively supported 
their campaigns. In addition, the Colombiahhn government established a program called 
Convivir, which was similar to an armed neighborhood watch program. The 
paramilitaries went after the easiest targets, the UP and left-wing politicians, students and 
anyone who campaigned for the FARC and the other insurgencies. It is estimated that 
nearly 4,000 UP politicians and supporters were killed between 1985 and 1990.163 
Estimating the size and strength of the FARC in terms of manpower has been 
difficult throughout its history. Many of the historical figures for its enlistment vary; an 
exact number is seldom agreed upon. However, most authorities on the FARC do agree 
that the organization reached a peak in manpower strength during the late 1990s to mid-
2000s when it was estimated to have 40,000 to 50,000 combatants.164 
In 2008, the FARC was dealt a significant blow to its seven-member leadership 
group known as the Secretariat. First, on March 1, 2008, during a Colombian military 
attack on a FARC camp in Ecuador, at least 25 people were killed, including the FARC’s 
second highest ranking commander, Raul Reyes.165 Also that month, Ivan Rios, another 
member of FARC’s secretariat, was murdered by his bodyguard.166 Also in March, the 
FARC’s top commander, Manuel Marulanda, died from a heart attack.167 Brittain quotes 
another source in his book who says following the raid, “Colombians are for the first time 
raising the possibility that a guerrilla group once thought invincible could be forced into 
peace negotiations or even defeated militarily. Weakened by infiltrators and facing 
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constant combat and aerial bombardment, the insurgency is losing members in record 
numbers.”168 
The raid, which killed Raul Reyes, also yielded significant intelligence 
information, when the Colombian military was able to recover Reyes’ personal laptop 
computer. Information recovered from the captured laptops indicated Venezuela was 
providing support for the FARC.169 The files also included information that the FARC 
had provided campaign funds of at least $100,000 to Ecuadorian President, Rafael 
Correa, which helped his 2006 election.170 It is an important point in understanding the 
crime-terrorism nexus, and how illicit funds from drug trafficking can be used to 
manipulate the outcome of elections, especially those of economically poor, third world 
countries.  
The analysis of the computer files also indicated the Venezuelan government had 
agreed to allow FARC to use Venezuelan territory as a safe haven from Colombia’s 
military, and the FARC has been able to meet with “political sympathizers, humanitarian 
organizations, members of terrorist groups and potential suppliers of weaponry.”171 The 
analysis also included information pertinent to this discussion of the crime-terror nexus 
stating, “Venezuela has become an important corridor through which FARC exports the 
cocaine which provides much of the group’s revenues.”172 It is an important point in 
terms of understanding the crime-terror nexus because it highlights the fact that nation 
states will support both criminal and terroristic activities in an effort to subvert the 
existing governments of other nations. 
In March 2008, the Bush administration initiated a legal review of Venezuela to 
consider whether the country should be designated a state sponsor of terrorism by the 
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U.S. State Department. Venezuela never received the designation.173 Both former 
Venezuelan President Chávez, and President Correa, adamantly denied the claims. 
Venezuelan authorities claimed the data was fabricated by Colombia and the United 
States. However, in May 2008, Interpol confirmed the authenticity of the data, adding the 
files contained on the laptops had not been manipulated since they were recovered 
following the raid.174  
Additional evidence of the cross border relationship between the FARC and these 
two Bolivarian nations came to light after the 2008 raid into Ecuador. Colombian 
intelligence claimed 11 high-ranking members of the FARC based its operations across 
the Colombian borders with Venezuela and Ecuador, beyond the reach of the Colombian 
military.175 In 2009, Gabriel Silva Lujan, the Colombian Minister of Defense, claimed 
that the FARC was operating from camps in areas across the border with Ecuador.176 
Later in 2009, a senior Ecuadorian military official confirmed eight new FARC bases had 
been discovered along the Ecuadorian side of the border with Colombia.177 
In May 2010, Brazilian authorities arrested a high-ranking FARC militant in the 
Brazilian state of Amazonas. Shortly afterwards, they claimed the FARC carried out drug 
trafficking and weapons trafficking from permanent bases in Brazil near the border with 
Colombia.178 In October 2010, General Francisco Contreras, the commander of the 
Peruvian military, made a similar claim, stating the FARC maintain bases in his 
country.179 
A. THE FARC AND TERRORISM 
The following section is designed to give the reader a brief description of the 
different types of terrorism that the FARC has engaged in over the years. It is important 
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to note the U.S. Department of State officially designated the FARC a foreign terrorist 
organization on October 8, 1997.180 Canada designated the FARC a terrorist entity in 
2003.181  
1. Targeted Assassinations 
One of the most publicized cases of the FARC’s engagement in targeted 
assassinations occurred in 2002. Isaias Duarte Cancino, who was the Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Cali, was shot and killed by two young men.182 Duarte had been an 
outspoken critic of both political and drug related violence occurring in Colombia.183 For 
example, in 2000, Archbishop Duarte wrote, “A rebel who kidnaps and kills, eliminates 
entire populations and mocks the whole process of peace lacks the virtues proper to a 
human being and becomes the most miserable of men.”184  
A prosecutor from Colombia’s National Unit of Human Rights linked the murder 
to the FARC in 2001.185 The gunmen, Alexander de Jesus Zapata, and John Fredy 
Jimenez, were found guilty on January 18, 2005.186 They were given a 36-year and 35-
year sentence, respectively. Seven years later, in 2012, four leaders of the FARC, 
including Rodrigo Londoño Echeverry, also known as “Timochenko,” were convicted by 
a Colombian court for having ordered the assassination in retaliation for Duarte’s 
condemnation of the many atrocities committed by the FARC.187  
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2. Bombings and Attacks on Critical Infrastructure
The State Department’s 2011 Country Reports on Terrorism indicated, “the 
FARC alone was responsible for 377 attacks in 2011.”188 This number constitutes 79% of 
all terrorist attacks that occurred in the Western Hemisphere that year.189 In 2012, FARC 
targets for attack included critical infrastructure of Colombia’s energy sector, such as the 
electrical grid, and railroads used for the transportation of coal, and natural gas 
pipelines.190 According to June Beittel, 70% of Colombia’s exports come from energy 
and mining, while about 12% of the country’s gross domestic product comes straight 
from oil.191  
3. Kidnapping Activities
The principal human rights violation perpetrated by the FARC has been 
kidnapping, primarily of middle- and upper-class Colombians.192 Many of these civilian 
kidnap victims are held by the FARC for ransom to help fund its operations.193 However, 
it is difficult for the FARC to argue that the financial proceeds acquired through the 
practice have offset the public backlash it has experienced in response to holding 
kidnapped police officers, soldiers, and political figures in jungle camps for years.194 
Most Colombians, including the poor, no longer view kidnapping as class 
warfare, but rather as violation of human rights.195 While the FARC continues to justify 
its kidnappings of middle and upper class citizens as class warfare, many human rights 
groups believe it violates international humanitarian law as violence against non-
combatants.196  
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B. FARC AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
1. Drug Trafficking 
During the 7th FARC conference in 1982, the leadership of the FARC planned to 
expand extortion activities it referred to as “commodity taxes” on items, such as coffee, 
gold, livestock, and oil in the areas it controlled.197 An important point worth noting is 
that the expansion of extortion on commodities included a decision to tax illegal drug 
trafficking.  
Initially, the leadership of the FARC was opposed to engagement in drug 
trafficking, either the cultivation or distribution because it saw it as contrary to the social 
contract with the people, and viewed the use of drugs as “an elitist disease.”198 It changed 
its position after realizing that poor farmers in the rural areas the FARC controlled had 
few options but to cultivate illegal drugs, and understood that a strict anti-drug policy 
would alienate their base of support.199 They understood drug trafficking organizations 
and paramilitary groups were taking advantage of the poor farmers by paying them with 
“bazuco,” a high addictive derivative of coca paste.200 Protecting the farmers was seen as 
a justification for levying a tax against coca sales.  
The drug traffickers who could not match the military firepower of the FARC, 
tolerated the taxes they had to pay. However, they formed paramilitary groups to defend 
their land, and themselves, and to challenge the FARC militarily for control of coca 
producing regions of the country. By the early 1980s, the FARC and the drug traffickers 
were on opposing sides of the conflict.201 
The FARC worked to consolidate its control over most of Colombia’s coca-
growing regions, throughout the 1980s and 1990s.202 The coca plantations became an 
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important source of economic support for the peasants.203 The FARC provided protection 
for the peasant farmers who worked the land within their area of operation.204 The FARC 
would levy a tax between 7% to 10% of the market value on a kilo of coca paste.205 
Author Nizah Richani estimated by the early 1990s, the FARC was earning between $60 
and $100 million annually.206 These numbers highlight an important point as it relates to 
the crime-terror nexus, because it specifically shows these groups are making significant 
amounts of money from their criminal activities, which in turn can be used to sustain 
their operations against the United States and its allies. 
Still, not everyone is willing to condemn the FARC’s taxation of illegal drugs. 
For example, Leech believes the attention called to the FARC’s involvement in the drug 
trade is nothing more than an attempt to delegitimize its taxation on both legal and illegal 
activities within the areas they control.207 Another example is Francisco E. Thoumi, an 
economist who points out that differences exist between the FARC and the drug cartels 
because the FARC uses drug trafficking money to support its subversive and political 
activities, rather than for personal profits. Thoumi also claims the FARC has not 
developed an international marketing network, and therefore, is not a cartel.208 Political 
scientist, Russell Crandall, defended the FARC’s involvement in the drug trade because 
the guerillas see it as “a necessary evil” for the organization to achieve its goals of 
bringing about political change in Colombia.209 Regardless of whether the members of 
the FARC are profiting directly or not, or whether they have an international distribution 
network, a point that could be argued both ways, the FARC is fully engaging in drug 
trafficking, cultivation, taxation of drug crops, distribution on an international level, and 
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enjoys significant profits from these activities.210 In fact, according to some estimates in 
the late 1990s, the FARC was earning as much as $900 million a year.211 
Information obtained from the laptop of Raul Reyes, who was killed in Ecuador 
as described earlier in this case study, revealed a 2007 letter that detailed a plan to sell 
cocaine directly to Mexican transnational criminal organizations.212 The letter proposed 
selling 100 kilograms of cocaine to the Mexicans in a trial run.213 In 2008, Colombia’s 
deputy defense minister, Sergio Jaramillo, provided confirmation of the crime-terror 
nexus when he said the FARC was selling cocaine to the Mexican cartels.214 This last 
point is of particular interest in understanding the crime-terror nexus, because it 
demonstrates the collaborative relationship between MTCOs and the FARC. 
In April 2010, a EUROPOL report indicated the FARC was planning to expand 
its activities to Europe. According to the report, “FARC has identified Europe as a main 
area of strategic interest in its ambitions to expand its activities. Making use of its 
contacts in Europe...FARC has sent representatives to some member states. Their tasks 
include the dissemination of information and the creation of clandestine cells to facilitate 
drugs trafficking and the procurement of arms.” The report also said the FARC was, 
“planning to open an office in Amsterdam, Brussels or Paris.”215 
In November 2013, authorities in Costa Rica arrested four members of the FARC, 
as well as a Costa Rican and Nicaraguan, after receiving a tip from the DEA.216 The 
group was using a legitimate armory business as a front to import drugs and weapons, 
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which were then smuggled across the border into Mexico.217 During the takedown 
operation, the Costa Rican authorities seized 35 firearms and 492 kilos of cocaine.218  
Two important points should be noted from the incident in Costa Rica. First, 
Nicaragua is one of the 12 social democratic nations that make up the Bolivarian 
Alliance, and is under the leadership of Daniel Ortega, the former leader of the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front, a democratic socialist political party.219 The second point is 
that the FARC is engaged in smuggling more than drugs into Mexico, a nation originally 
targeted for subversion by the Soviet Union in the 1950s, and later by Cuba in the mid-
1980s. Both points are relevant to understanding the crime-terror nexus because it is just 
one example of how the FARC, a designated foreign terrorist organization, is 
collaborating with the MTCOs, who are often on the receiving end of the FARC’s 
shipments of both drugs and weapons.220 
2. Extortion Activities 
The FARC has also used extortion of oil companies as a means of financial 
support, particularly when oil was discovered in more remote areas, such as Arauca and 
Casanare.221 The FARC would bomb oil pipelines and facilities, often in coordination 
with the National Liberation Army (ELN), as a means of extorting money from big oil 
companies.222 Eventually, the frequency of these attacks would prompt the government 
to pay a $1 per barrel “war tax” for the protection of the oil employees and 
infrastructure.223 
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3. Other Types of Criminal Activity 
This thesis has focused on two crimes, extortion activities and drug trafficking, in 
which the FARC has been heavily engaged. However, its criminal activity involves much 
more. Like most large criminal organizations, the FARC have not limited its criminal 
activity to one or two types of crime. For example, Beittel’s 2012 report indicated, “the 
FARC has diversified from kidnapping into illegal mining and logging, cattle rustling, 
and extortion to supplement its income after drug trafficking.”224 John Otis, of the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center adds, “With the price of gold soaring, the FARC 
imposes taxes on illegal gold mines in rebel-dominated areas. The FARC is also involved 
in operations to mine tungsten and coltan, which are used for consumer electronics such 
as cell phones and DVD players.”225 The FARC has also been accused of operating a 
large auto theft ring, where cars stolen in Colombia are parted out and sold in Venezuela 
and Ecuador, which nets the organization an estimated $7 million a year.226  
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VI. CASE STUDY #3—MEXICAN TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL
ORGANIZATIONS 
The previous two case studies have examined Hezbollah and the FARC. This 
third and final case study examines the MTCOs. How best to describe the violence 
occurring in Mexico has been the subject of much debate.227 MTCOs are generally 
considered to be organized criminal enterprises, and have, therefore, been excluded from 
designation as a FTO.228 However, some subject matter experts have adamantly stated 
their opinions about designating the MTCOs as FTOs. For example, Sylvia Longmire 
states, “Mexican drug traffickers are more than criminals. They are terrorists.”229 This 
case study considers the various nefarious activities of the MTCOs in an effort to give the 
readers a better understanding of the threat posed by the MTCOs, and help them 
determine for themselves whether designating the MTCOs as FTOs is truly warranted. 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, a variety of factors gave rise to the MTCOs and the 
subsequent violence that has been occurring in Mexico. The first factor involved an 
increase in collaboration between the U.S. and Colombian governments during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, as the two countries worked closely together to disrupt the 
activities of the Colombian Medellin and Cali cartels.230 This collaboration focused 
attention on the disruption of the smuggling routes through the Caribbean, as the cartels 
attempted to get their products to the markets in the United States.231 This increase of law 
enforcement efforts to disrupt the drug trade in the Caribbean had serious consequences 
for the rise of MTCOs.232 By the mid-1990s, as the Colombian cartels began to collapse, 
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they started outsourcing the transportation of cocaine to MTCOs who were smuggling 
cocaine and meth to the United States using land-based routes through Mexico.233  
The second factor widely believed to have brought about the rise of the MTCOs 
was the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement or NAFTA, which 
pumped billions of dollars back into the Mexican economy.234 The agreement, which was 
signed by the United States, Canada, and Mexico in 1994, removed tariffs on trade and 
investment among the three nations.235 Unfortunately, while NAFTA helped to improve 
the flow of legal goods, it also made it easier to import illicit goods.236 According to Phil 
Jordan, who was the DEA’s Director of the El Paso Intelligence Center at the time 
NAFTA was implemented, the trade agreement was a “deal made in narco-heaven.”237 
The third factor that has given rise to the power of the MTCOs was when the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) began to lose political clout during the late 20th 
century.238 For most of the 20th century, the PRI provided stability to the trafficking of 
narcotics by acting as a market enforcer and referee between the different MTCOs.239 
According to Dr. Hal Brands, “The cartels provided bribes and kept violence to a 
minimum. In return, the PRI protected the kingpins and resolved conflicts between them, 
most notably by allocating access to the drug corridors (plazas) to the United States.”240 
However, this traditional arrangement began to break down in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, as the PRI lost political influence. Shannon K. O’Neil has said, “Electoral 
competition nullified the unwritten understandings, requiring drug lords to negotiate with 
the new political establishment and encouraging rival traffickers to bid for new market 
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opportunities.”241 This loss of political clout by the PRI changed the balance of power 
within what Dr. Roy Godson, has described as the political-criminal nexus.242 This shift 
in the balance of power resulted in violent clashes as MTCOs attempted to seize new 
opportunities, control drug smuggling territory known a plazas, and increase their share 
of the drug market.243 
This third factor is of particular interest to the discussions of the crime-terror 
nexus because the violence that surrounds the MTCOs has been designated as being 
criminal in nature because it does not meet most definitions of terrorism due to a lack of a 
political component. However, the change in the relationship between the PRI and the 
MTCOs points to the fact that the MTCOs have been engaged in politics for quite some 
time. While their end goal remains financial gain, rather than a desire to govern for 
themselves, this desire should not be interpreted to mean they do not engage in political 
activities. They engage in political activities with the goal of creating a friendly 
environment for their various illicit activities. 
As the wealth and power of the MTCOs grew, they escalated their use of violent 
paramilitary enforcement groups.244 MTCOs “use such groups to protect operations and 
drug shipments, as well as to target members of rival drug cartels, and government 
officials such as law enforcement officers.”245 An example of these paramilitary groups 
would be the Los Zetas cartel, which began as the enforcement arm of the Gulf Cartel 
when Osiel “The Friend Killer” Cardenas Guillen recruited 31 members of the Mexican 
Army’s elite Airborne Special Forces Group, known as GAFEs.246 The soldiers, with 
expertise in irregular warfare tactics, heavy weapons, intelligence operations, counter 
surveillance procedures, and the operation of sophisticated communications systems, 
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were “seduced by higher salaries—referred to as a ‘canonazo de dolares’ or cannon ball 
of dollars.”247  
Several subject matter experts now believe the MTCOs constitute a serious threat 
to destabilize Mexico. For example, Dr. Max G. Manwaring, has said the implications for 
Mexico could be “some manifestation of state failure.”248 Author Sylvia Longmire 
believes the MTCOs are a destabilizing threat because they have better weapons, armor, 
and often better training than Mexican or U.S. law enforcement.249 Javier Cruz Angulo 
agrees with Longmire’s assessment and believes the MTCOs are using “war-fighting” 
that go well beyond typical strategies used by organized crime.250 Robert Bunker added 
Mexico is as a nation is no longer capable of governing entire sections within its 
sovereign territory, and because it has been taken over by a “narco-insurgency” and is 
heavily influenced the MTCOs.251 All these different opinions are relevant to the 
discussion of the crime-terror nexus because they are indications of the serious chaos and 
disorder that surrounds the MTCOs, which could be used to subvert the legitimate 
government of Mexico. 
A. MEXICAN TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS AND 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 
1. Drug Trafficking 
Illegal drug trafficking is an extremely profitable business. Estimates put the 
profits from the global drug trade at $320 billion a year or more.252 Mexico’s share of 
that trade is generally thought to be at least $30 to $35 billion, and some estimates place 
                                                 
247 Carpenter, The Fire Next Door: Mexico’s Drug Violence and the Danger to America.  
248 Max G. Manwaring, A New Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment the 
Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 
2009). 
249 Longmire and Longmire, Redefining Terrorism: Why Mexican Drug Trafficking is More than 
Organized Crime, 35. 
250 Carpenter, The Fire Next Door: Mexico’s Drug Violence and the Danger to America.  
251 Bunker, “Strategic Threat: Narcos and Narcotics Overview,” 8–29. 
252 Carpenter, The Fire Next Door: Mexico’s Drug Violence and the Danger to America.  
 59 
the figure as high as $60 billion.253 By most estimates, Americans will spend somewhere 
between $18 and $39 billion annually on illegal drugs.254 When asked about the costs of 
Mexico’s war on drugs, Mexican Supreme Court Justice Eduardo Medina Mora said, “In 
a sense, the United States is already financing this war. It is just financing the wrong 
side.”255 
According to the DEA’s 2014 National Drug Threat Assessment, “Several drug 
data sources indicate that methamphetamine availability is increasing in the United 
States.”256 The assessment goes on to indicate the domestic production of 
methamphetamine (meth) is low, and the high availability of meth in the United States 
has a direct correlation to the high levels of production of meth in Mexico.257 It is also 
worth noting the assessment indicates that since 2008, the numbers of meth labs seized in 
Mexico have increased significantly, and a three-fold increase has occurred in the number 
of meth seizures at the southwest border in the past five years.258  
Reporting from federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies indicates 
heroin availability has increased throughout the United States.259 Heroin has increased as 
a threat in areas all across the United States, particularly in New England and the Great 
Lakes regions, where heroin overdose deaths have increased in the last few years.260 
According to the National Drug Threat Assessment, heroin is the second greatest drug 
threat next to meth.261 The assessment also indicates most of the heroin seized in the 
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United States is produced in either the Andean region of South America (51%), or 
Mexico (49%).262 
The MTCOs are primarily engaged in smuggling four types of illegal drugs into 
the United States. As indicated by the previous paragraphs, the first two include meth and 
heroin. However, cocaine and meth are ranked as the first and second most profitable 
drugs, while marijuana constitutes the largest volume drug smuggled across the 
border.263 All four drugs smuggled into the United States by the MTCOs are widely 
available in significant quantities.264  
As previously indicated, the MTCOs are heavily engaged in drug trafficking. 
Therefore, it is easy to understand why the MTCOs are also commonly referred to as 
DTOs. However, author Ian Grillo, as well as a number of other subject matter experts, 
believes, “Drug-trafficking organization is no longer a sufficient term for them; they are 
a criminal paramilitary complex.”265 The drug trafficking activities of the MTCOs is 
relevant to the understanding of the crime-terror nexus because it establishes a baseline of 
common illicit behavior between Hezbollah, the FARC, and the MTCOs. The enormous 
financial gains that go along with the drug trade also helps to explain how the MTCOs 
have been able to gain the military grade weapons and training necessary to threaten both 
the Mexican law enforcement, the Mexican military, and the Mexican citizens. 
2. Extortion Activities 
The MTCOs frequently engage in extortion of both illicit and licit businesses. For 
example, author Ion Grillo describes how the Los Zetas would generate their own income 
by engaging in extortion. “At first, they taxed anyone in the drug business, including 
marijuana growers and street dealers. Later, they branched out to shake down anything in 
sight.”266  
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A prime example of how the MTCOs shake down business owners occurred on 
August 25, 2011, in Monterrey, Mexico. When Raul Rocha Cantu and Jose Alberto 
Rocha Cantu, the owners of the Casino Royale San Jeronimo, failed to pay their monthly 
extortion fee, the Los Zetas decided to send them a message.267 Eyewitness accounts 
differ as to exactly what happened inside the casino. Some witnesses claimed the Zetas 
poured gasoline on the floor and set the building on fire. Others claimed to have heard 
gunfire followed by explosions and smoke. While some of the patrons managed to 
escape, 53 people perished as a result of the fire. At least one account indicated the first 
responders had to cut their way into the building because the exits had been locked shut 
to prevent people from using the fire escapes.268  
The website, Borderland Beats, described the incident saying it “can only be 
regarded as a terrorist attack.”269 Then Mexican President Calderon called the incident an 
“aberrant act of terror and barbarity.”270 Members of President Calderon’s cabinet, such 
as Alejandro Poire, the Secretary of the Interior, echoed the president’s sentiments, “An 
unspeakable, repugnant, unacceptable act of terror has been committed.”271  
According to some reports, several U.S. companies have decided not to invest in 
Mexico due to MTCO extortion and violence.272 For example, Terex Corp., a Westport, 
CT maker of construction cranes and other heavy equipment, decided not to build a 
manufacturing plant in Mexico.273 Terex CEO, Ron Defoe said, “We won’t put a factory 
in Mexico until some of this violence gets addressed.”274 
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The extortion activities of the MTCOs are important to understand the crime-
terror nexus because while extortion itself is an inherently criminal activity, the nature 
with which it is carried out can take on characteristics of terrorism. The case of the 
Royale Casino, and the reaction of President Calderon and his cabinet members, points to 
the psychological impact of extortion activities of the MTCOs, and how these activities 
are interpreted by the general public and government of Mexico.  
3. Other Types of Criminal Activity 
The MTCOs do not limit their criminal activity to only trafficking in narcotics. 
Instead, they have branched out to engage in a whole host of criminal activity.275 They 
also murder rival cartel members.276 They raid Mexican Petroleums or PEMEX 
installations to steal oil, gasoline, explosives, and solvents used to produce meth.277 They 
are engaged in smuggling migrants across both the northern and southern borders of 
Mexico.278 They buy and operate legitimate businesses to launder money, engage in 
human trafficking operating prostitution rings, orchestrate prison breakouts, commit 
arson, and a litany of other felony crimes.279 Some MTCOs, such as the Los Zetas, are 
even selling counterfeit merchandize, such as pirated DVDs of the latest blockbuster 
movies.280 
The discussion of the other types of criminal activity in which the MTCOs are 
engaged is also important to understanding the crime-terror nexus because many of these 
crimes, if not all, are activities that Hezbollah and the FARC are involved in as well. 
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B. MEXICAN TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS AND 
THE USE OF TERROR TACTICS 
1. Targeted Assassinations 
The Los Zetas also established relationships with deserters from the Guatemalan 
elite Special Forces known as Kaibiles.281 The Kaibiles provided instruction in 
decapitations, which led the Los Zetas to adopt beheadings as a tactic of intimidation in 
2006.282 The first beheading incident occurred in April of that year when Los Zetas 
decapitated two Mexican police officers in Acapulco, apparently in retaliation for the 
shooting of four Zetas during a shootout.283  
Some subject matter experts have pointed out the use of social media by the 
MTCOs closely resembles that of al-Qaeda. For example, Ioan Grillo says, “Some of the 
first narco snuff videos looked almost frame for frame like Al Qaeda execution videos: a 
victim strapped to a chair; a ski-masked man grasped a sword; a head sliced off.”284 This 
utilization is important to understanding the crime-terror nexus because it demonstrates 
that transnational criminal organizations are at the very least imitating the tactics and 
techniques of terrorist organizations. Also, the use of social media by the MTCOs is an 
example of how these transnational criminal organizations are attempting to intimidate, 
coerce, and threaten their rival cartels, government officials, and the Mexican public in 
the same manner as FTOs. 
Decapitating their enemies is only one of the gruesome practices employed by the 
MTCOs. Decapitation, castrations, butchery, such as quartering or skinning their victims, 
and incinerations, are all common place in Mexico.285 According to George Grayson, the 
MTCOs use terrorist tactics to instill fear in their out-group who will often shy away 
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from confrontations, and bolster their ability to extort money, as a method to use the 
media for propaganda to send messages to the public and their rivals.286  
The case of Rosalio Reta and Gabriel Cardona, both American teenagers who 
were recruited to be cartel assassins by the Los Zetas cartel, is an interesting illustration 
of the reach of the MTCOs.287 The Zetas put the teens through six months of military 
style training, and then sent them back to Texas to carry out murders of rival cartels 
members at the behest of the Zetas.288 The two boys were paid a retainer of $500 a week. 
Then, they were reimbursed with a substantial supply of cocaine and $50,000 in cash for 
each assassination they carried out.289 “There are sleeper cells in the U.S.,” said 
Detective Garcia of the Laredo Police Department. “They’re here in the United 
States.”290 Both boys plead guilty to murder, Cardona to seven murders, and Reta to 
two.291 This case is relevant to the crime-terror nexus as it demonstrates the MTCOs are 
not above carrying out assassinations north of the border, and it also demonstrates their 
ability to recruit American teens to carry out their dirty work.  
2. Bombings and Attacks on Critical Infrastructure 
The use of explosives by the MTCOs is commonplace. For example, more than a 
100 grenade attacks occurred during the first four years of the Calderon administration 
alone.292 On November 5, 2010, in one eight-hour battle between the Mexican marines 
and members of the Gulf Cartel, kingpin Antonio Ezequiel Cardenas, alias Tony 
Tormenta, was killed in Matamoros, and more than 300 grenades were set off.293 
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Another example of a grenade attack occurred when eight civilians were killed 
during the Mexican Independence day celebration in 2008.294 Moments after the 
governor rang a bell for independence, the attackers lobbed grenades into an 
unsuspecting crowd at the main square of Morelia.295 Revelers initially thought the noise 
of the explosions was from fireworks, but then witnessed dozens of victims, men, 
women, and children, covered in blood with devastating injuries.296 Author Iaon Grillo 
said the incident is a good example of terrorism.297 This incident points to the manner in 
which the MTCOs will engage in terroristic activities to intimidate, coerce, and threaten 
the general public, leaving the public with the feeling that the legitimate government can 
no longer protect them. 
Car bombs are less common. Up until 2010, a few improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) scattered around the country had caused damage and injury but no deaths.298 
Then, on July 15, 2010, police in Juarez received an anonymous emergency call that 
reported a wounded policeman lying in the street at a major intersection.299 When police, 
emergency medical personnel, and other first responders arrived at the scene, a car bomb 
detonated killing three people and wounding dozens more.300 It was later determined the 
bomb had contained approximately 22 pounds of Tovex, an industrial explosive.301 This 
incident is important to understanding of the crime-terror nexus because again, it serves 
as an example of the way in which MTCOs are imitating the tactics of terrorist 
organizations. The tactic of drawing first responders to a specific location before 
detonating an explosive device mimics the tactics frequently used by terrorist 
organizations in the Middle East. 









At different times, the MTCOs have also used vehicle borne improvised explosive 
devices (VBIED) against government forces.302 The first incident occurred on October 
20, 2011 in Monterrey, Mexico when an Army patrol identified a suspicious vehicle.303 
When they attempted to stop the vehicle, the driver fled and the Army gave pursuit. As 
the pursuit continued, a cell phone detonated a VBIED along the side of the road just 
moments before the Army vehicles passed the location.304 No soldiers or civilians were 
injured in the incident, but El Universal news agency later reported the Los Zetas were 
responsible for the attack.305 
3. Kidnapping Activities
Kidnapping for ransom is the cruelest activities the MCTOs engage in regularly. 
Since 2007, the number of abductions has skyrocketed. According to a government study, 
a 317 percent increase occurred in the number of kidnappings during the five-year period 
between 2005 and 2010.306 In 2010, Mexico averaged 3.7 reported abductions every day, 
for a total of 1,350 over the year.307 According to anticrime groups, many kidnappings go 
unreported.308 Some estimates say the ratio of reported kidnappings to unreported could 
be in the neighborhood of 1 to 10, because the kidnappers threaten to harm the victim if 
the incident is reported to law enforcement authorities.309 
A notable incident of kidnapping occurred in 2008, when Los Zetas kidnapped an 
affluent attorney near Veracruz, Mexico and held him captive for three days while 
demanding $300,000 for his release.310 He was released only after his business partners 
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and son raised the money to pay his ransom. Afterwards, when state officials learned of 
the incident, they requested the lawyer and his family remain silent about the incident.311 
They feared any negative publicity about the incident would reflect poorly on Veracruz 
and the governor who had aspirations of becoming the President of Mexico one day.312  
In January 2013, members of the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva (CJNG), a small cartel 
that is part of the Sinaloa Federation, committed one of the most heinous kidnappings on 
record.313 That morning, five members of CJNG kidnapped a 10-year old girl named 
Irma Isaisa Jasmine Arroyo near Tecoman, Mexico.314 They raped her, killed her, 
incinerated her body, and callously dumped her remains in an orchard.315 Unfortunately, 
while they were targeting the daughter of a rival cartel member, in a case of mistaken 
identity, they grabbed the wrong little girl.316 Irma and family were completely innocent, 
and had never been involved in drug trafficking.317  
Kidnappings by the MTCOs is also relevant to the discussion of the crime-terror 
nexus, because it is another indication of common illicit behavior that Hezbollah and the 
FARC either do or did engage in at one time. 
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VII. ANALYSIS OF THE THREE CASE STUDIES 
The previous three chapters contained historical case studies of three non-state 
groups: Hezbollah, the FARC, and the MTCOs. This chapter compares the findings and 
provides analysis of the information contained in the three case studies using social 
identity theory as a framework.  
A. HEZBOLLAH’S IN-GROUPS AND OUT-GROUPS 
Hezbollah is a Shi’a Muslim political organization based in Lebanon.318 
Hezbollah “operates within the confines of a state system,” and their aims are “liberation 
of specific territory.”319 Hezbollah’s agenda is also not purely Islamic, but blends Islamic 
and the national concerns together in a manner that garners the support of the Lebanese 
people who are within the Islamic sphere.320 Hezbollah’s in-groups include Muslims, d 
Shi’a religious sect within the Islamic faith, and many Lebanese citizens who support its 
political positions. Hezbollah’s understanding of Lebanese independence is framed by a 
belief that wealthy western nations pose a serious threat to Lebanese self-
determination.321 
Hezbollah is the client to the Islamic Republic of Iran, which supplies Hezbollah 
with support by sending Hezbollah members of the Islamic Republican Guard Corps 
Quds Force to assist with training, and provide supplies in the form of weapons and 
munitions.322 Also, Iran supplies Hezbollah with considerable financial support.323 In 
return, Hezbollah emulates and supports Islamic state ideology, while at the same time, 
helping to expand Iran’s sphere of influence in the region.  
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Hezbollah’s in-groups and out-groups have changed throughout its history 
depending on the political context within Lebanon. For example, during the 2005 
elections, Hezbollah entered into a political alliance with two of the domestic out-groups, 
Saad Hariri’s Future movement, and Samir Geagea’s Lebanese Forces, with the stated 
purpose of “safeguarding the resistance.”324 Following the election, Hezbollah accepted 
posts in the cabinet that included their former adversaries. The cabinet would express 
support for the resistance, although later, the alliance would break apart over 
disagreements surrounding the investigation into the assassination of former Lebonese 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, a Sunni Muslim, which resulted in Hezbollah and Amal 
withdrawing their ministers from the cabinet.325 In February 2006, Hezbollah entered 
into a new alliance with the Christian Free Patriotic Movement, led by Michel Aoun, in 
an effort to counterbalance the anti-Syrian March 14th coalition.326 Hezbollah’s critics 
would later accuse the party of protecting Hariri’s killers, a charge Hezbollah denies, but 
which fostered Sunni-Shiite tensions in Lebanon.327  
Amal, another Shia political movement, is another good example of how 
Hezbollah’s in-groups and out-groups have changed based on their political needs. The 
Amal movement, which is opposed to the political dominance of the Maronite Christians 
in the Lebanese confessional government, has at times been an out-group to Hezbollah as 
the two groups competed for the support of the Lebanese Shi’a. However, in recent years, 
Amal has formed an alliance with Hezbollah, and in 2005, they were part of the March 
8th coalition that showed solidarity with the al-Asad government in Sryia.328  
From the perspective of the Emic, Hezbollah believes resistance is strength.329 It 
believes resistance is the only way to confront a national and regional order that is based 
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on western influence from their two primary out-groups, the United States and Israel.330 
To Hezbollah’s highly politicized religious perspective, neutrality is not an option in 
matters of justice versus injustice.331 Understanding the emic is important to the 
contextual understanding of both Hezbollah’s 1985 Open Letter and the 2009 Manifesto.  
According to the 1985 Manifesto, Hezbollah’s out-groups at that time included 
communists and capitalists, and similarly, the Soviet Union and the United States, as well 
as Israel, which it refers to as the Zionist entity. Hezbollah’s “Open Letter” outlined the 
party’s three primary goals: (1) continue the resistance against Israel and western forces 
within Lebanon, (2) reject Lebanon’s confessional political system, and (3) support the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon.332 However, Hassan Nasrallah has denied 
that Hezbollah has ever proposed an Islamic Republic in Lebanon.333 
An example of one of Hezbollah’s honor challenges to Israel happened on July 
12, 2006. Hezbollah military forces, known as the Islamic Resistance, conducted a cross-
border raid into Israeli territory near the Shebba Farms area.334 Three Israeli soldiers 
were killed, two more were wounded, and two were captured by Hezbollah and taken 
back across the border into Lebanon.335  
The Israeli response was swift and harsh. The Israeli military attempted to isolate 
the battlefield by cutting off escape routes from Southern Lebanon with airstrikes and 
artillery bombardments on airports, seaports, roads, and bridges throughout the 
country.336 Lebanon’s infrastructure sustained heavy damage as a result of the war. 
Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nassrallah, would later admit they had made “a major 
miscalculation.”337 Nassrallah indicated the operation would not have proceeded had 
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Hezbollah’s leadership predicted by “one percent” the Israeli response to the kidnapping 
of the IDF soldiers.338 
In 2009, Hezbollah released a new, revised manifesto, but the historical context 
also needs to be considered to understand the emic fully. As stated previously, Hezbollah 
was undergoing a transition from a resistance movement to a legitimate political party, 
and part of the Lebanese government. The 2009 manifesto still indicates the group’s 
primary purpose is resistance to the hegemony of the United States, and resistance to the 
“Zionist entity.” However, the new document makes no mention of the Soviet Union, 
which had collapsed in 1989. However, it also says nothing about communism, which 
still exists as a form of government in several countries throughout the world.  
The response from the international community was one of disapproval, most 
notably from a number of Middle Eastern countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, 
and the United Arab Emirates. The Saudi government in particular referred to 
Hezbollah’s cross-border raid as “uncalculated adventures.”339 Generally speaking, Israel 
held the moral high ground during the conflict while Hezbollah was widely condemned 
for violating Israeli territory. Even in Lebanon, many people outside the Shi’a community 
blamed Hezbollah for billions of dollars of infrastructure damaged by Israeli bombing 
done during the “July War.”340 
However, within the Shi’a community of Southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah 
enjoys a strong base of support, the organization’s standing was bolstered by the July 
War.341 This increase in support was in part due to its swift response to the needs of those 
whose homes or businesses had been damaged or destroyed during the war.342 Hezbollah 
paid between $10,000 and $12,000 to an estimated 15,000 Shi’a Muslims who had lost 
their homes. It is important to note that Shi’a Muslims were not the only benefactors of 
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Hezbollah’s charity following the July war of 2006. Many Christians living in southern 
Lebanon also received help in the immediate aftermath of the war. Hezbollah doctors also 
provided free medical services and dispensed free medication.343 Free meals were also 
provided for several weeks to those families impacted by the war.344 Hezbollah’s patron, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, provided most of the money for these relief efforts.345 
Therefore, within its primary in-group, Hezbollah’s support remained as strong as ever, 
but it also enjoyed the support of its nominal in-groups, such as the Lebanese Christians. 
Of particular importance to the understanding of the crime-terror nexus is 
Hezbollah’s reference in the 2009 Manifesto of “the liberalization, independence and 
dominance rejection experiences of Latin America countries.”346 In particular, Hezbollah 
was referencing the Bolivarian Alliance, which at that time, was led by Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez. The 2009 Manifesto goes on to suggest that Hezbollah saw 
“grounds for overlap” with the Bolivarian Alliance, which it believed would lead to a 
“more equitable and balanced international order.”  
To appreciate fully Hezbollah’s 2009 reference to the Bolivarian Alliance, it 
should be understood that Iran and Venezuela had entered into 340 new memoranda of 
understanding347 during the three-year period between 2006 and 2009. Additionally, on 
November 25, 2009, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was hosted at an official 
state visit by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, during a three nation tour of South 
America.348 During the visit, both Ahmadinejad and Chavez pledged their solidarity 
against the imperialism of the United States.349 Hezbollah’s 2009 Manifesto was released 
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to the public on November 30, 2009.350 Thus, just five days after Hezbollah’s patron Iran 
was courting members of the Bolivarian Alliance during a tour of South America, 
Hezbollah as the client was dutifully expressing its “great interest and appreciation” for 
the Bolivarian Alliance. 
B. THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA 
The FARC has been a Marxist-Leninist non-state actor predominately operating 
from the remote regions of Colombia with roots in the peasant self-defense groups that 
emerged during a period that became known as “La Violencia.”351 The FARC’s primary 
in-group, includes the “rural peasants,” the “working class,” or “proletariat” of Colombia. 
It is also accurate to say its in-groups include other communist insurgencies operating in 
Colombia, such as the ELN, although at times, its relationship with the ELN has been 
strained over the control of territory, resources, and support from the rural Colombian 
communities for which the groups are in competition.352 The FARC’s other more 
nominal in-groups include other communist nations and movements throughout Latin 
America, such as the member states of the Bolivarian Alliance.353 Its nominal in-groups 
also include other designated terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah and the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA),354 and criminal organizations, such as Los Zetas and the Sinaloa 
Federation, with whom it at times cooperate, and at times, are in competition with for 
limited resources.355  
The FARC’s stated goals include overthrowing the established order in Colombia, 
while driving American “imperialists” out of Latin America, and establishing a Marxist, 
or at least socialist government in Colombia.356 Therefore, the FARC’s out-groups 
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include the “established order” or in Marxist terms, the bourgeoisie, the United States and 
its neoliberal economic policies, and last but not least, the government of Colombia. 
An example of the FARC’s challenges to the Colombian government occurred 
during the failed peace negotiations that took place between 1998 and 2002 under 
Colombian President Pastrana. The Pastrana Administration attempted to negotiate a 
peace agreement with the FARC, and even went so far as to grant refuge to the FARC in 
a large demilitarized section of Colombia totaling approximately 42,000 square 
kilometers, or roughly the size of Switzerland.357 First, during an incident that became 
known as “the empty chair episode,” FARC leader Marulanda did not show up for the 
opening ceremony of the peace negotiations, which left President Pastrana sitting next to 
an empty chair. Additionally, as the negotiations dragged on, the FARC took advantage 
of the time to re-arm and regroup. The negotiations finally broke down after the FARC 
hijacked a commercial airliner, and kidnapped a Colombian senator. 
The FARC’s patrons have changed over the 50 plus years of its existence. 
However, intelligence revealed because of Colombia’s March 2008 cross-border raid into 
Ecuador, which killed the FARC’s second highest leader, Raul Reyes, suggests 
Venezuela, as well as other members of the Bolivarian Alliance, such as Ecuador and 
Cuba, are currently the FARC’s patrons. Both Venezuela and Ecuador have allowed the 
FARC to use the border regions of their countries as refuge from the Colombian 
military.358 Intelligence gained from laptops recovered during the raid revealed that 
Venezuela was also providing the FARC with logistical support by providing the group 
with weapons and ammunition.359 More recently, Venezuelan officials have been 
accused of allowing the FARC to utilize their country as a transit point for drug 
shipments to North America and Europe.360 As the client, the FARC has kept up pressure 
on the Colombian government by conducting subversive activities. The FARC has also 
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helped to extend the influence of the Bolivarian Alliance by providing drug money to 
help fund the election campaigns of social democrats, as was the case with President 
Rafael Correa’s 2006 presidential campaign, although Correa denied the accusation.361  
The FARC also serves as the patrons to the peasant farmers in remote parts of the 
country. Its doctors provide medical care in these communities, and it helps to regulate 
the price of coca sold to the MTCOs.362 In return, the coca farmers provide the guerrillas 
with new recruits, and help to grow coca crops; the sale of which helps to fund the 
FARC’s ongoing operations against the Colombian government.363 
Starting in 2010, the FARC began releasing some of its high value kidnapping 
hostages in an effort to win popular support from the people of Colombia.364 In 
November 2011, however, the FARC killed four members of the Colombian security 
forces it had been holding hostage for more than a decade. The hostages were killed as 
the Colombian military approached a FARC camp in a rural southern part of Colombia. 
The incident was a public relations nightmare and prompted a public outcry from 
thousands of demonstrators in cities across the country expressing their disgust with the 
FARC. In this case of a negative honor challenge by FARC, the social group of 
importance to the Colombian government, the Colombian public at large, served as the 
final arbiter and decided the result of the challenge was a gain or increase in support for 
the Colombian government, and a loss of honor for the FARC. Therefore, if the limited 
good is considered to be the sphere of influence over the public that both the FARC and 
the Colombian government are competing for, then the FARC was on the losing end of 
this particular honor/challenge. 
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C. THE MEXICAN TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS  
The in-group for the MTCOs is the other members of the criminal enterprise, both 
at the source of supply and the end distribution point. Therefore, in most cases, these 
groups would include those who supply the MTCOs with both drugs and the precursor 
chemicals for drugs, as well as local street gangs they are in a patron-client relationship 
with, such as MS-13 and Barrios Azteca, who provide end-point distribution for their 
products.365 Its out-groups include rival cartels that it struggles with for control of drug 
trafficking corridors or plazas, government authorities, including Mexican law 
enforcement, military and judicial officials, and often, innocent members of the Mexican 
public who get in the way of the MTCOs.366  
The ongoing extreme violent context is representative of the serious negative 
honor challenges that form the basis of relationships between the MTCOs and the 
government, as well as the relationships between rival MTCOs. For example, the MTCOs 
exist in a constant feedback loop of both negative and positive honor challenges with 
public officials that secure their ability to continue operations.367 These negative and 
positive honor challenges often take the form of the “plata o plomo” challenge, meaning 
“silver or lead.” Silver represents a financial bribe, and lead represents a bullet used to 
inflict serious bodily injury or death to individuals and their immediate family members. 
This common phrase is an example of how the MTCOs employ the bribe/threat culture to 
dominate cartel/government relations. Regardless of which choice the public official 
makes, both outcomes allow the cartels to operate unhindered. In most cases, the cartels 
would rather pay the bribe as opposed to kill the government official. However, if it 
becomes necessary to use violence, it is usually extreme with the victim’s bodies 
displayed in a very public manner, and often accompanied by a narco-banner threatening 
those who do not cooperate with the MTCOs. This extreme use of violence is used to set 
the tone for future “plata o plomo” honor/challenges to government officials. Mexican 
                                                 




authorities estimate the MTCOs pay out approximately $100 million dollars in bribes 
every month to state and municipal police officers throughout Mexico.368  
The level of public corruption is so bad that following the second escape of El 
Chapo Guzman, polls conducted by Parametria, found 17 percent of Mexicans believed 
Guzman was the sole mastermind of his escape from Altiplano federal prison.369 
However, 77 percent of those polled believed Mexican government officials were 
complicit in his escape.370 Therefore, if the Mexican public is the final arbiter of the 
negative honor challenge, then the constant challenge of “plata o plomo,” results in a loss 
of honor for the Mexican authorities. 
The MTCOs also frequently present negative honor challenges to their rival 
cartels using very public methods. For example, in September 2011, a highly secretive 
and militarized branch of the Sinaloa Federation, known as Gente Nueva, drove two 
trucks onto an overpass near Veracruz, Mexico.371 Then, as horrified citizens watched, 
the drivers began unloading 35 semi-nude bodies, many with apparent signs of torture, 
onto the road.372 A short time later, the Mexican government announced the victims were 
members of Sinaloa Federation rival Los Zetas and most had extensive criminal records 
for murder, kidnapping, drug trafficking, and extortion.373 The suspects left a narco-
banner at the scene claiming responsibility and threatening Los Zetas.374 
MTCOs act as patrons to violent street gangs, such as Mara Salvatrucha-13 or 
MS-13, and Barrios Azteca. For example, in the case of MS-13, the Sinaloa Cartel, as the 
patron, recruited MS-13 members who serve as its clients, and to help distribute drugs in 
the United States, and assist in its war with the Los Zetas.375 In return, the Sinaloa Cartel 
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gave MS-13 an increased cash flow, better expertise, and training in the use of violent 
tactics, money laundering, and corruption of public officials, as well as access to new 
drug markets.376  
However, the patron/client relationships of the MTCOs are not limited to their 
relationships with violent street gangs. Many people have suggested the MTCOs are also 
in a patron/client relationship with the government of Venezuela. For example, Roger 
Noriega, who served as Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemispheric Affairs 
between 2003 and 2005, has said Venezuelan government officials have close ties with 
“Colombian narco-traffickers, and guerrillas, Mexican cocaine kingpins, Central 
American operatives, politicians, and Hezbollah terrorists” that form a crime-terror 
network that “sows lawlessness, bloodshed and mayhem” throughout the Western 
hemisphere.377 Others, such as Max Manwaring, have pointed to the Bolivarian Alliance, 
led by Venezuela, as offering political and material support for the FARC, Hezbollah, 
and “other non-state actors such as African and Mexican Transnational Criminal 
Organizations.”378 Venezuela, as the patron, and the rest of the Bolivarian Alliance, 
“frequently use MTCOs as a form of statecraft.”379 It has also been said that Venezuela 
and the Bolivarian Alliance act as a gateway for non-state actors and proxies hostile to 
the United States, such as “Hezbollah, the Basque ETA, transnational organized crime 
groups.”380 The U.S. Department of Treasury has also charged members of the 
Venezuelan government as drug kingpins pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin 
Designation Act (Kingpin Act) for coordinating the transportation of “thousands of 
kilograms of cocaine from Colombia through Venezuela to Mexico, for transportation to 
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and distribution within the United States.”381 Therefore, the Venezuelan government 
serves as the patron by facilitating the trafficking of weapons and drugs from the Andes 
region to North America; thus, shortening the supplies lines for the client MTCOs. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
A. RISKY BUSINESS—A STUDY BY THE WEST POINT 
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER 
In May 2014, Dr. Scott Helfstein and Dr. John Solomon released the findings of 
their study of the interrelationship between crime and terror entitled, Risky Business: The 
Global Threat Network and the Politics of Contraband. More specifically, the study 
looked across a broad range of illicit activities including terrorism, drug trafficking, 
organized crime, human smuggling, and political corruption. Using social network 
analysis, Helfstein and Solomon identified 2,700 people linked by 15,000 relationships 
on a global scale that spanned 122 countries.382  
Their findings also discredit one of the most commonly held perceptions about the 
crime-terror nexus, which is that the nexus or convergence of crime and terror is more 
likely to occur in failed states or economically poor countries. This argument is largely 
based on four assumptions: (1) in poor economies, people are more likely to engage in 
illicit behaviors, (2) criminals and terrorists thrive in places with weak economies and 
governments, (3) because it is easy for criminals and terrorists to collaborate, they will, 
and (4) government and illicit actors are adversaries.383 However, the findings of 
Helfstein’s and Solomon’s study give strategy level decision makers several reasons to 
question all these assumptions. 
Helfstein and Solomon were able to draw several conclusions from their study, 
which are important to understanding the crime-terror nexus, and ability to formulate an 
effective strategy for dealing with the problem. For example, their study found that rather 
than two separate networks, one of criminals and the other of terrorists, in reality, only a 
single network exists comprised of both criminals and terrorists. The study also found 
that “by most measures of connectivity, terrorists are more central than almost all other 
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types of criminals, second only to narcotics smugglers.”384 Moreover, their study found 
that terrorists are not shunned by criminals due to social norms or fear of attracting 
greater scrutiny or retribution from law enforcement officials. 
Perhaps one of the most relevant findings of the study as it relates to U.S. 
homeland security is the connectivity between criminals and terrorists “is highest in 
resource-rich countries, which tend to have more capable law enforcement and 
counterterrorism forces.”385 Helfstein and Solomon explain that these resource rich 
environments present more operational challenges than the permissive environments of 
failed states.386 However, the wealth and prestige of these resource rich countries also 
makes them attractive targets for both criminals and terrorists.387 Understood in this 
context, a comparative advantage exists in collaboration between criminals and terrorists 
in resource rich countries. 
B. PROBLEMS WITH DEFINING “TERRORISM” 
Equally relevant to the understanding of the crime-terror nexus is the problems 
with multiple competing definitions and categories of terrorism. The case studies 
revealed the heterogeneous nature of the activities of these three violent sub-national 
groups. Yet, only two of the groups have been designated as FTOs. The MTCOs, despite 
the remarkably violent nature of many of their activities, which are designed to threaten, 
intimidate, and coerce the government of Mexico, rival cartels, and the citizens of 
Mexico, are still largely viewed as nothing more than criminals. This viewpoint can 
attributed to the motives behind their violence, which of course is profit, rather than 
politics. However, it is important to remember that how to define terrorism properly has 
little consensus. 
Some of the early efforts to explain terrorism centered on different typologies 
based on the motives of those committing the acts of terrorism. For example, in 1974, 
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Professor Paul Wilkinson said there are four types of terrorism. According to Wilkinson, 
the four distinct types of terrorism include criminal, psychic, war, and political 
terrorism.388 However, Wilkinson’s focus was solely on political terrorism, and his book, 
Political Terrorism, did not to address the other three forms of terrorism.  
By 1983, some researchers were beginning to question this method of 
categorizing terrorism based on the motive. Michael Stohl explained, “Motives are 
entirely irrelevant to the concept of political terrorism. Most analysts fail to recognize this 
and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives as logical or necessary aspects of terrorism. 
But they are not.”389 
Researcher and Professor Alex P. Schmid appears to have agreed saying, “just as 
we can define sabotage, revolution or war without explaining the underlying motives, we 
can define terrorism without entering the value-ladden area of moving causes.” He would 
go on to note 22 different categories in 109 different, competing definitions existed while 
conducting research for his study Political Terrorism: A Research Guide.390 At the end 
of his authoritative study, Schmid admitted he and his partner, A. J. Jorgman, could not 
offer “a true or correct definition of terrorism.”391 As he would explain “terrorism is an 
abstract phenomenon,” and a correct definition would be “the one which is consistently 
used.”392 Finally, Schmid concluded, “In the field of terrorism there is no agreement 
about any single definition.”393 
Schmid, however, is not alone in his frustration with defining terrorism. It was the 
opinion of noted historian and political commentator, Walter Laqueur, that the effort to 
define terrorism was neither possible nor worthwhile.394 Conor Gearty pointed out, “It 
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may thus be most useful to call off the search for a coherent definition and to accept that 
advances will be possible only when we abandon the hope that there is a credible answer 
to the question—what is terrorism?”395 
Even the U.S. government cannot agree upon a single definition of terrorism. 
Several writers have pointed out that the U.S. State Department, Department of 
Homeland Security, Department of Defense, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) all use completely different definitions, which reflect the operational priorities of 
each specific department or agency.396 However, all these definitions focus on the 
“politics” of the terrorists as their motive for most of their activities. 
The fact the U.S. State Department has not designated the MTCOs as foreign 
terrorist organizations is based on a belief the MTCOs do not have political motives. This 
belief is problematic because it demonstrates a lack of understanding in the fact that the 
MTCOs are heavily engaged in politics, albeit for different reasons than most designated 
terrorist organizations. Organizations, such as Hezbollah and the FARC, engage in 
terrorism to either change or subvert their existing governments. The MTCOs, on the 
other hand, engage in politics through the use of bribes, funding election campaigns, and 
pure terroristic threats and intimidation for the purpose of controlling the government of 
Mexico.397 When the crime-terror nexus occurs and the MTCOs form alliances with 
FTOs, the terrorist organizations profit from drug trafficking, and the MTCOs become 
more powerful and increase their political influence.398  
The focus on the motives of these violent sub-national groups also ignores the fact 
that at times, different nation states have exploited the Lumpenproletariat or professional 
criminal organizations to subvert a foreign government. This tactic is nothing new, and at 
times, has been written about by different authors. For example, Paul Wilkinson wrote in 
1974, “there is the phenomenon of the exploitation of criminal methods by political 
movements seeking either to supplement their funds by means of expropriation of 
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criminal methods by protection rackets in order to obtain weapons or simply to augment 
their armed strength in a period of internal war.”399 In 1990, author Rachel Ehrenfeld 
addressed the subject by defining “narco-terrorism” as “the use of drug trafficking to 
advance the objectives of certain governments and terrorist organizations.”400 More 
recently, in the conclusion of their study entitled Risky Business described previously, 
Helfstein and Solomon stated in their conclusion, “State sponsorship of terrorism is well 
known, but state sponsorship of crime in pursuit of national goals is also a problem, and it 
is an area that deserves greater study and analysis.” This statement is true, particularly as 
it applies to Marxist Communist ideology, use of the Lumpenproletariat, and the goal of 
creating chaos, havoc, and disorder. 
It is important and relevant to the discussion of the crime-terror nexus to 
remember that many of these violent sub-national groups, both FTOs and MTCOs, are 
dynamic, amorphous, and constantly evolving. Their activities are so diverse, they cut 
across all the most common attempts to categorize or label any group engaged in similar 
activities. As the three case studies contained in this thesis suggest, the activities of these 
violent sub-national groups are so heterogeneous as to defy all attempts to define, label, 
or categorize them. In fact, the activities of these violent sub-national groups are so 
protean in nature,401 they have best been described by analysts as the “gray area 
phenomenon.”402 This term is used “to group together in one category the range of 
conflicts across the world that no longer conformed to traditionally accepted notions of 
war as fighting between armed forces of two or more established states, but instead 
involved irregular forces as one or more combatants.”403 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The crime-terror nexus presents a number of challenges for U.S. homeland 
security practitioners, most especially in the field of domestic intelligence. In his book, 
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“Intelligence and Surprise Attack, Dr. Erik Dahl makes the argument that “more effort 
needs to be placed on intelligence collection, especially at the domestic and local level.” 
Dahl goes on to point out that terrorist attacks are seldom detected or interrupted by 
strategic level intelligence, rather more often, “plots are disrupted as a result of tips from 
the public, informants working for local law enforcement, and long-term surveillance of 
suspects.”404 The three case studies presented in this thesis, and the analysis and 
conclusions, support Dr. Dahl’s claim that more effort needs to be placed on intelligence 
collection, especially at the domestic and local levels. 
Moreover, following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence, recognizing the need for a National Criminal Intelligence 
Sharing Plan convened a committee of law enforcement executives, which would become 
known as the Global Intelligence Working Group (GWIG). The purpose of the GWIG 
was to make recommendations that “would correct the inadequacies and barriers that 
impede information and intelligence sharing.”405 Ten years later, the GIWG was 
reconvened to assess the progress that had been made on the initial recommendations 
made in 2003. This reassessment resulted in a new version, 2.0, of the National 
Intelligence Information Sharing Plan, which was released in 2013. Both versions make a 
number of recommendations for improving the flow of criminal intelligence and 
information sharing across all levels of government and on a national level. 
Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, a number of the recommendations have not been 
implemented. In light of the threat now posed by the crime-terror nexus, strategic level 
decision makers across the U.S. homeland security enterprise should review both 
versions of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, and work collaboratively to 
implement the recommendations contained in both versions. 
Just as these violent sub-national groups are dynamic, amorphous, and constantly 
evolving, law enforcement agencies across the U.S. homeland security enterprise need to 
be as well if they are to be prepared to meet the threat posed by the crime-terror nexus 
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adequately. Rising to the challenge will require training, both on the threat posed by the 
crime-terror nexus, and on the proper intelligence collection and reporting. Strategic level 
decision makers should place particular importance on the proper reporting of 
transnational crime and terrorism by state, local, and tribal levels to the appropriate 
domestic intelligence entities, such as the high intensity drug trafficking area, 
investigative support centers and the joint terrorism task forces, respectively. 
Moreover, in the conclusion of their study Risky Business, Helfstein and Solomon 
astutely observed, “The nature of crime-terror connectivity suggests that maintaining 
such rigid boundaries may not always be the most effective approach, and utilizing 
resources and techniques associated with counterterrorism in conjunction with 
counternarcotics may yield the best results.”406 The General Counterdrug Intelligence 
Plan included a similar finding and recommended “consolidating and collocating” 
domestic counterdrug intelligence elements into specific geographic areas.407 Moreover, 
in April 2013, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) released report number 13–471 
entitled, Information Sharing. The GAO examined a number of best practices across the 
five domestic intelligence entities.408 The report identified collocation as the best practice 
for improving the sharing of domestic intelligence.409 Strategic level decision makers 
across the U.S. homeland security enterprise should consider working to increase the 
collaboration and reduce the division between the fields of counterdrug and 
counterterrorism intelligence to disrupt the crime-terror nexus more effectively. 
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